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FAIR USE FOR FREE, OR PERMITTED-BUT-PAID?
Jane C Ginsburg
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios fended a
fork in the fair use road. The Court there upset the longstanding expectation that uses would
rarely, if ever, be fair when the whole of a work was copied. In the aftermath of that
decision, lower courts have rendered a plethora of decisions deeming the copying of an
entire work (even with no additional authorship contribution) a fair use, and therefore "free"
in both senses of the word. A perceived social benefit or some market failure appears to
motivate these decisions. This is because fair use is an on/off switch: either the challenged
use is an infringement of copyright or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares "is not an
infringement of copyright." As a result, either the copyright owner can stop the use, or the
user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no compensation for
the use. I contend that fair use for free should be available only where a second author
copies in the creation of a new work (instances which I will call productive uses). By
contrast, when the entire work is copied for essentially distributive purposes, courts and
legislatures should sometimes allow the use, but subject it to an obligation to compensate
authors and rights holders. This is not a radical idea: the United States is in fact an outlier in
the broader international landscape of copyright exceptions. Many countries have permitted-
but-paid regimes for various uses, including those by libraries, educational institutions, and
technologies. Indeed, the United States has some as well, particularly respecting new
technological modes of dissemination. For many authors and other members of the creative
communities, while their works stoke the engines of others' enterprises, the Internet age has
proffered more rags than riches. Creators should be compensated for the non-creative reuse
of their works.
( 2014 Jane C. Ginsburg.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fair use is an on/off switch: either the challenged use is an infringement
of copyright or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares "is not an
infringement of copyright."' As a result, either the copyright owner can stop
the use2 or the user is not only dispensed from obtaining permission, but also
owes no compensation for the use. The unpaid nature of fair use introduces
pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the "transformative"
character of the use,3 and of potential market harm. Faced with a use, notably
in the context of new technologies, that a court perceives to be socially
beneficial, a court may overemphasize its "transformativeness," and
correspondingly underestimate the market consequences, in order to prevent
the copyright owner from frustrating the social benefit.4 Distortions can
appear in the other direction as well: a court sensitive to the economic
consequences of the unpaid use may feel obliged to downplay the public
interest fostered by the use.' Statutory licenses or privately negotiated accords
within a statutory framework can alleviate the tension by ensuring that uses
the legislator perceives to be in the public interest proceed free of the
copyright owner's veto, but with compensation-in other words: permitted-
but-paid.'
1. 17 U.S.C. §107 (2012) ("[The fair use of a copyrighted work... is not an
infringement of copyright.").
2. But see suggestions, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10
(1994) and Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), afd sub nom. Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), that the appropriate remedy may be monetary-in effect,
judicially imposed compulsory licenses; the defendants in those cases, however, produced
new works of authorship-they did not merely redistribute the underlying work; my analysis
addresses distributive rather than creative uses.
3. Recent fair use caselaw suggests that once the use is deemed "transformative" it
becomes presumptively "fair." See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text (discussing
domination of "transformative" finding in fair use analysis).
4. E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12-
01521 WHA, 2013 WL 1899851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) (all decisions involving search
engines' storage, indexation, and reproduction of photographic images); Authors Guild, Inc.
v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussed infra).
5. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (search
engine's thumbnail images substitute for market for downloading reduced-sized images to
cellphones, market harm factor favors plaintiffs; fair use defense rejected despite benefit
conferred by search engines), abrogated by AmaZon, 508 F.3d 1146.
6. That some uses should be legally permitted, but should also be compensated, may
be an idea whose time is coming in the United States. See Doug Lichtman, Fair Use Middle
Ground, MEDIA INSTITUTE (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/
081114.php.
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That legislatures should sometimes allow the use, but subject it to an
obligation to compensate authors and rights holders, is not a radical idea: the
United States is in fact an outlier in the broader international landscape of
copyright exceptions. The copyright laws of European Union ("EU")
member states, and Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, do not include an
all-purpose fair use defense; but all these states have enacted a panoply of
copyright exceptions, particularly for library, educational, and technology
uses, many of which require remuneration.' (The United States also has
several specific copyright exceptions, for library, educational, and certain
other nonprofit uses, but they do not usually require remuneration.!) Thus,
while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an all-or-nothing choice,
other countries have charted middle courses between barring the use and
permitting its unremunerated pursuit.
In contending that some uses previously ruled "fair" should not remain
unpaid, this Article argues that the copyright law should distinguish new
distributions from new works, and should confine (free) "fair use" to the
latter.' This Article proposes that many distribution uses formerly deemed
"fair" be "permitted-but-paid," and be subject to a statutory framework for
license negotiations, with compulsory licensing as a backstop. Permitted-but-
paid uses may be divided into two classes: subsidy (socially worthy
redistributions) and market failure (transaction costs are too high to warrant
a licensing solution; or a new mode of dissemination-an infant industry-is
threatened by copyright-owner recalcitrance). Because the inclusion of a use
within the market failure class turns largely on facts that may evolve, these
uses' classification as permitted-but-paid should be subject to a phase out; for
example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review by the Copyright
Office."o
Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-or-nothing, a
fair use outcome is virtually assured. But were permitted-but-paid an option,
7. See discussion infra Section III.
8. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 5§ 108 (library exceptions), 110(1)(2) (educational exceptions),
121 (people with disabilities).
9. In referring to fair uses that yield "new works," I deliberately avoid the term
"transformative," which I believe has obscured analysis ever since courts began to attach
that label to "uses" unmoored from "works." My proposal does not necessarily entail
payment for all distributive uses; as a practical matter, many of these are impliedly licensed
or "tolerated." See generally Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTs 617 (2008)
(analyzing the intersection between "tolerated use" [casual, non-commercial infringement]
and traditionally "fair" uses). By the same token, some distributive uses currently ruled "fair"
might be left to be licensed in the free market.
10. Thanks to Lital Helman for inspiring this solution. Sunset provisions are not
unknown in U.S. Copyright law; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §5 119, 601 (2012).
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we would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a
perceived social good. The licensing mechanism would allow both broader
dissemination and provide payment to authors. One might rejoin that there is
no need to license if the use is fair. But in that class of cases where the use is
"fair" only because it supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then
permitted-but-paid should replace fair use for free.
This Article does not propose any change to the analysis of fair use cases
involving new creativity." Analytical difficulties may abound there as well
(for example, how much copying is too much; where lies the line between a
fair use parody and an infringing derivative work), but they arise in the
strongest normative universe for free use.12 The situations I intend to address
often come down to assessing whether a new use should be exempted from
copyright liability in order to enable a new business model or to ensure
relatively inexpensive dissemination in furtherance of socially worthy goals
such as nonprofit education. The normative claims underlying redistributive
uses are not based on authorship but rather on "information policy," a
notion which may cover both the interests of readers in receiving works of
authorship" and of new distributors in purveying them.
I recognize that my categories present a variety of line-drawing
challenges. First, some would dispute my initial distinction between new-
authorship (true) fair use, and subsidy or market-failure "fair" use." That
dispute probably derives from different normative visions of the value of
creating new expression as opposed to receiving or reiterating extant
expression. As a result, I note the disagreement, but move on. Second, the
subsidy and market-failure categories may overlap as excessive transaction
costs may also characterize some of the kinds of uses I have characterized as
subsidies, and social benefit may buttress the appeal of the transaction-costs
justification for a permitted use. Nonetheless, I believe the categories are
distinct, because there may be social policy reasons to continue to subsidize a
11. Although, were I reforming what I will call "true" fair use, I would make
authorship attribution a factor in assessing fair use. Cf Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and
amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], arts. 10
and 10bis (requiring authorship attribution for certain quotation exceptions).
12. But cf Hon. J. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair
Use? The 1999 Donald C Brace Memorial Lecture, 46 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 513 (1998-
1999) (urging that the derivative works right be replaced by compulsory licensing).
13. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814 (2011); Jessica Litman, Readers' Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 325 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1982); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
1387
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1383
use even if the transaction-costs problem could be overcome. Finally, there is
another boundary issue: permitted-but-paid must be cabined so that it avoids
the slippery slide into two opposite extremes. On the one hand, my proposal
should not lead to turning all of copyright law into a "liability rule"; on the
other, it should not promote the conclusion that any use that can be paid for
should be compensated (if not controlled).
The Article proceeds as follows. It first examines the evolution of the
two classes of new-distribution fair use cases. As examples of social
subsidies, the Article considers the treatment of educational copying from
the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act through Cambridge University
Press v. Becker (the Georgia State online "reserves" controversy)," and then
turns to library copying and the HathiTrust case.'6 Market-failure cases
encompass a range of examples of mass use of copyright works, from private
copying to mass digitization (e.g., Google Books) to search engines.
The next part of this Article looks to Europe, Australia, New Zealand,
and Canada. These copyright regimes have typically provided compensation
schemes for many of the non-creative uses surveyed here. The United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have also established, or are
considering instituting, "license it or lose it" systems to promote socially
beneficial distributions of copyrighted works. Moreover, some European
countries have addressed market-failure problems through "extended
collective licensing" systems that merge features of statutory licenses and
private ordering.
Finally, I consider how to implement permitted-but-paid in the United
States. As an initial matter, I inquire whether, subsequent to the Supreme
15. Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012),
rev'd, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). Author's note: as this issue was going to press, the
Eleventh Circuit announced its decision reversing and remanding for fuller analysis of the
fair use factors. For an analysis see Jane C. Ginsburg, Electronic course reserves: From false clarily
to true obscurity? MEDIA INSTITUTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: IP VIEWPOINTS
(October 31, 2014), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/103114.php.
Another type of non-creative use of entire works (not analyzed here) is evidentiary
use, for example submission of copies of third-party works in court proceedings-see, e.g.,
Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., No. 10 CIV 9538, 2011 WL 5082410 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,
2011); Shell v. City of Radford, Virginia, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005)-or as
evidence of prior art in patent applications-see American Institute of Physics v.
Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., Civ. No. 12-528, 2013 WL 1395867 (D. Minn.
Apr. 8, 2013). See also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artfact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992) (arguing that this kind of use is use of copyrighted expression
as "fact" and therefore should be an uncompensated fair use).
16. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 12-4547-cv, 2014 WL 2576342 (2d Cir. June
10, 2014), afg 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange," the tightened conditions for issuing
preliminary and permanent injunctions are resulting in a de facto permitted-
but-paid regime. If the usual panoply of copyright remedies nonetheless
largely remains available, can the shadow of injunctive relief stimulate private
ordering? Can judges provide the impetus to private ordering by making fair
use the backstop to a "license it or lose it" regime? Or is legislation needed to
enable private ordering, for example, by lessening antitrust constraints? If
legislation is a necessary adjunct to private ordering, who will set the
backdrop royalty rates, and how will the rates be determined? I suggest that
the Copyright Royalty Board might assume that task of rate setting if the
parties cannot agree, but the Board should apply the method of last best
offer arbitration (sometimes referred to as "baseball arbitration") to arrive at
the rate.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF REDISTRIBUTION FAIR USE
U.S. copyright law has long recognized fair use as an exception favoring
new creativity." Justice Story's 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh," to which
many assign the doctrine's ancestor attribution,2 0 refined the British rule of
"fair abridgement"2 1 to emphasize the authorship contributions of the alleged
infringer, as well as their impact on the market for the copied work. Justice
Story distinguished between "real, substantial condensation of the materials,
17. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
18. The doctrinal roots of the fair use exception for new creativity can be traced back
to the 1841 Supreme Court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901), discussed infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. "New creativity fair use"
cases still outnumber "new distribution fair use" cases on today's dockets. For an illustrative
but far from exhaustive list of modern "new creativity fair use" cases, see, for example,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (commercial parody of Roy
Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" by 2 Live Crew rap group); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d
694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation art); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448
F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (reduced size reproductions of seven posters in biography of the
band the Grateful Dead); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (appropriation art);
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of Vanity Fair
cover photograph).
19. Folsom v. Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
20. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. See generally R. Anthony Reese, The Stog of Folsom
v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
21. Epitomized in decisions such as Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.),
and Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B) . On the role of "fair abridgement" in
promoting new creativity, see, e.g., ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 170-72 (2010). On fair abridgement as a
precursor to fair use, see, e.g., Matthew Sag, The Prehistog of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1371 (2011).
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and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon" and "merely the facile
use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief
value of the original work."2 2 The ensuing century-and-a-half of fair use cases
almost exclusively debated the nature of the second author's additions or
alterations, pitted against the first author or copyright owner's prospects for
exploiting the work.23 The caselaw thus calibrated the basic moving parts of
the traditional fair use doctrine: authorship, public benefit, economic impact.
The progress of learning24 advances when the law allows follow-on authors
to bestow their intellectual labor and judgment in reworking selections from
a prior work, without prejudicing the profits or prospects of that work.
New distribution fair uses are different. They do not directly produce
new works. (I recognize that new distribution uses may enrich the end user's
knowledge and reflections in ways that ultimately inform some subsequent
creative endeavor, 25 but the same might be said of everything, from works of
authorship to cups of coffee, that becomes an input in a prospective author's
creative process.) What motivations, therefore, underlie non-authorship-
based exceptions? The caselaw and legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act indicate two broad impetuses. First, the category I have, perhaps
provocatively, called "subsidy," 26 in which copying for non-commercial
distribution purposes (generally by educational institutions or libraries)
receives a free pass (subject to a variety of limitations). (I recognize that
some, particularly those who reject the characterization of copyright as a
22. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345. Although in that case Judge Story found the use of the
work (George Washington's letters) to be infringing, notably because the letters constituted
over one-third of defendant's work and "impart[ed] to it . .. its essential value," he
nonetheless praised the defendant's objective of producing works for school libraries, and
expressed the hope that the parties might come to an "amicable settlement." Id. at 349.
Folsom v. Marsh might thus be seen as a precursor to the social-subsidy variant of permitted-
but-paid; thanks for this point to Eva Subotnick.
23. See, e.g., cases cited, supra note 18; see also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). For an
analysis of courts' application of fair use under the 1909 Copyright Act, see Alan Latman,
Study No. 14: Fair Use of Copynghted Works, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT: ARTHUR FISHER
MEMORIAL EDITION 781, 783-93 (Copyright Soc'y of U.S.A. eds., 1963).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have power ... to promote the
progress of science . . . ."); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
306-311 (1966) (applying fair use when enforcement of copyright, by rightowner who
sought to suppress information, would frustrate the progress of science).
25. Thanks to Wendy J. Gordon for this observation.
26. But not as provocatively as, for example, Robert P. Merges, who has suggested that
fair use across the board obliges authors to subsidize user-beneficiaries. See Robert P.
Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights In The 'Newtonian" World Of On-line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 115-16 (1997).
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"property right" will similarly contest the proposition that fair use effectively
requires authors to underwrite free uses in the public interest.) Second, and
primarily in the case of distribution uses developed by new (generally
commercial) market entrants, "market failure" may justify both those uses
that are as a practical matter insusceptible to licensing, notably because of
their volume, and (more controversially) those whose licensing may be
possible but whose licensors are unreasonably intractable.27 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, courts do not generally announce the latter basis, since it both
implies second-guessing business decisions and ascribes sinister motivations
to the refusal to license. As a result, those who invoke this justification are
often unsuccessful.28 Nonetheless, I believe it underlies some fair use
decisions, notably the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in DISH Networks,2 9
whose fair use analysis (like the cursory and result-oriented fair use analysis in
the Supreme Court's Sony decision 3 0 on which it relies) is otherwise
unconvincing, at best.
The following discussion considers two kinds of new distribution fair
uses: first, social-subsidy fair use, including nonprofit education and libraries;
second, market-failure/new-market use, including private copying and mass
digitization.
27. A great deal has been written on market-failure fair use since Wendy J. Gordon's
seminal 1982 article in the Columbia Law Review. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600 (1982); see also Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights
Management on Copynght's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner
in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998);
David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction
Cost MinimiZation in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61 (2005); Alan L. Durham, Consumer
Modification of Copynghted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851 (2006); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83
S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Towards a Doctrine ofFair Use in Patent Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Robert Merges, The End of Friction, supra note 26; Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Jennifer
M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379
(2012).
28. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting defense that end-user filesharing was fair use; court observed that licensed
downloads were in prospect); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting defendant's contention that MP3 storage product was fair use
because plaintiff failed to show that licensing in this area was not "traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed" (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930
(2d Cir. 1994)). Cf Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31 (rejecting market-failure argument on grounds
that market failure no longer existed due to emerging licensing market).
29. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723, F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
30. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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A. SOCIAL-SUBSIDY FAIR USE
1. Nonprofit Educational Uses
a) Photocopying and the 1976 Act
Section 107(1) identifies "nonprofit educational purposes" as a use
whose "nature" and "purpose" favor a finding of fair use.3 1 The preamble to
section 107 lists among the uses which in general exemplify fair use (but
which courts must in each case examine) "teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use)."3 2 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the 1976
Act specifies one form of use that does not involve new creativity,3 though
the contours of this redistributive use remain undefined, and the inclusion of
a use in the preamble does not confer a presumption of "fairness."
Educational photocopying was in fact one of the most contested issues
during the legislative process leading up to the 1976 Act.3 4 The "Agreement
on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational
Institutions With Respect to Books and Periodicals"" ("Guidelines") that
emerged from this process offers some indication of Congress's intention
regarding the scope of fair use.
I do not wish to overemphasize the inferences to draw from the
Guidelines, in part because they are highly contested,3 6 and because by their
own terms, they identify a minimum threshold, in effect a safe harbor, thus
leaving open the possibility of more extensive permissible free use.37 But
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
32. Id. 5 107(2).
33. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.11 (1994) ("The obvious statutory
exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies
for classroom distribution.").
34. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyrght, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 887-88 (1987).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68-73 (1976).
36. Compare Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996) (Guidelines provide useful guidance), with Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227-29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (criticizing Guidelines' legitimacy).
For academic commentary critical of the Guidelines, see, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of
Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001); Gregory K.
Klingsporn, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use Guidelines, 23
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101 (1999); Litman, supra note 34; Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions:
Reconsidering Best Practices Statements In the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 371 (2010); Carol M. Silberberg, Note, Preserving Educational Fair
Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001).
37. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976) ("['Ihe following statement of guidelines is
not intended to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under
judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. There
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several features of the Guidelines suggest that they focus on the acts of
individual teachers. For example, in addition to a "brevity" component, the
Guidelines specify "spontaneity" ("the inspiration and decision to use the
work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so
close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a
request for permission")3 8; they limit multiple copying to no more than nine
instances during a term; and perhaps most significantly, with respect to the
intended beneficiary, "the copying of the material is for only one course in
the school in which the copies are made."" One may, therefore, query
whether systematic copying, particularly of substantial course materials,40 by
the educational institution, falls so far outside the Guidelines' ambit as to
exceed even the Guidelines' undefined additional breathing space.
By the same token, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee casts
doubt on the application of fair use to institutional educational copying. The
Committee surmised:
The fair use doctrine in the case of classroom copying would apply
primarily to the situation of a teacher who, acting individually and
at his own volition, makes one or more copies for temporary use
by himself or his pupils in the classroom. A different result is
indicated where the copying was done by the educational
institution, school system, or larger unit or where copying was
required or suggested by the school administration, either in special
instances or as part of a general plan.41
Educational institutions, however, have not been the defendants in most
of the cases involving educational copying. Although publishers sued New
York University in the early 1980s over its systematic preparation of
coursepacks, the case settled.42 The other photocopying decisions involved
may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below
may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.").
38. Id. at 69.
39. Id.
40. The Guidelines also state: "Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works." Id. at 69.
41. S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 63 (1975).
42. The case, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. New York University, No. 82 CIV 8333
(ADS), 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), settled "on terms which included the
incorporation of the Classroom Guidelines into the University's official photocopying
policies." Bernard Zidar, Comment, Fair Use and the Code of the Schooyard: Can Copyhops
Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (outlining
history of Addison and other early photocopying cases).
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commercial actors,43 thus considerably attenuating the "public benefit"
conferred by the unauthorized preparation of coursepacks. A decision
rendered shortly after the enactment of the 1976 Act, Engclopedia Britannica v.
Crooks," however, did involve educational copying (videotaping, not
photocopying) by institutional defendants, but the facts of the case did not
favor the application of fair use to institutional-level nonprofit educational
copying. There, the producers of educational videos charged that defendant
school districts, comprising over one hundred schools, videotaped television
broadcasts of their works, built a library of these videotaped works, and
made copies of these tapes for classroom use. Because educational
institutions constituted the principal market for the plaintiffs' works, the
school districts' systematic copying substituted for purchases of the
programs. The economic impact exceeded reasonable fair use tolerance even
for publicly beneficial goals.45
More recently, however, a district court has found fair use in a case
involving institutional-level creation of "electronic reserves," arguably the
digital-era equivalent of photocopied coursepacks."
b) Digital Copying
In Cambridge University Press v. Becker,47 three academic publishers
contended that Georgia State University systematically infringed their
copyrights by adopting a policy that permitted faculty members to make
excerpts from the plaintiffs' works as electronic course reserves through the
university library's website. The university's 2009 Copyright Policy allegedly
"led to continuing abuse of the fair use privilege" 48 by "mak[ing] professors
responsible for determining whether a particular use is a fair use" 49 and
requiring the professor to complete a "fair use checklist" to do so." The
43. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th
Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. 913, 922 (2d. Cir. 1994); Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
44. Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1155-56, 1174 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
45. Id. at 1174-79.
46. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201-02 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
47. Id. While I have classified coursepacks and electronic reserves as forms of
reiterative copying, one might contend that the selection of excerpts to copy results in a kind
of anthology, which might be considered not merely a new use but a new work; that there
may be some authorship component to the selection of materials to copy does not compel
such a recharacterization. The Georgia State court did not consider the copying at issue to be
"transformative." Id. at 1232 ("Taking into account the fact that this case involves only
mirror-image, nontransformative uses . . .
48. Id. at 1203.
49. Id. at 1219.
50. Id.
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plaintiffs identified seventy-five instances of alleged infringement during the
three full semesters after the Copyright Policy was adopted. Faculty members
had assigned the excerpts at issue as supplemental (but often required)
reading in graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses in language or
social science. The books from which the excerpts came were generally not
textbooks, but rather single-author monographs or edited collections of
multiple chapters by a variety of authors. The "great majority" of the
excerpts at issue constituted "a chapter or less from a multi-chapter book.""
The average copied excerpt constituted about 10% of the book from which it
was copied "(though some were considerably more and some were
considerably less)."52 Excerpts placed on electronic reserve were available by
password only to students enrolled in the course, and only during the
semester in which the student was enrolled, but students could create
permanent retention copies by downloading or printing the reserve readings
for their courses.
Following a bench trial, the court found most of the copying to be fair
use. Evaluating "the purpose and the character of the use," the court
concluded that the first factor favored fair use, because the copying fulfilled
the section 107 preamble-listed purposes of teaching students and for
scholarship and was performed by a nonprofit educational institution "for
strictly nonprofit educational purposes."" The court distinguished the
photocopy cases, whose defendants were for-profit entities. Pointing to the
statute's explicit inclusion of classroom copies, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the non-creative nature of the copying weighed
against fair use. Applying the second factor, the court deemed the works
primarily informational, hence more subject to fair use. The final two factors
furnished the most significant, and debatable, aspects of the court's analysis.
With respect to the third factor, the "amount and substantiality of the
portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," the court
attributed little significance to the Classroom Guidelines. Since the
Guidelines' safe harbor set the minimum standards of educational fair use,
not the maximum, the court concluded that the outcome of this factor's
analysis did not turn on meeting the Guidelines requirements. Turning
instead to the text of the third factor, the court addressed the question of
what constituted "the copyrighted work as a whole," in relation to which the
amount and substantiality of the defendant's copying should be evaluated.
Although the publishers urged that each chapter of their copyrighted books
51. Id. at 1233.
52. Id. at 1227.
53. Id. at 1224.
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should be seen as a separate work, so that copying an entire chapter would
constitute copying the entire work, the court ruled that the argument was not
timely raised.54 Moreover, conflating copyright ownership with the
identification of the "work," the court indicated that since the publishers had
obtained copyright assignments from the authors of the separate
contributions to edited volumes, those contributions should not be assessed
separately for purposes of fair use analysis, lest the publishers "choke out
nonprofit educational use of the chapter as a fair use." The court "w[ould]
not allow this to happen,"" and therefore analyzed the substantiality of the
copying with respect to the book as a whole.
Of course, an amount quantitatively insubstantial with respect to the
book as a whole could be qualitatively substantial, and therefore weigh
against fair use," but the court determined that because the books were
divided into distinct topics, the copied excerpts lacked "a dominant
relationship to the substance of the work as a whole."" It is not clear what
this standard means, but it appears to make qualitative insubstantiality an
inevitable consequence of addressing more than one topic per book.
Moreover,
it is relevant that selection of a whole chapter of a book (either from a
typical, single author chapter book or from an edited book) likely
will serve a more valuable educational purpose than an excerpt
containing a few isolated paragraphs. Professors want students to
absorb ideas and useful, context-based information. This can be
accomplished better through chapter assignments than through
truncated paragraphs. However, the selected excerpt must fill a
demonstrated, legitimate purpose in the course curriculum and must
be narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.
Thus, more copying is called for rather than less, especially since a court
is unlikely to second-guess the instructor's determination-by virtue of
assigning the excerpt-that the excerpt "fills a legitimate purpose in the
course curriculum . The same consideration that the publishers
54. Id at 1231-32.
55. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
56. By contrast, in Texaco, the court addressed not only the journal issue as a whole, but
treated each article as a "work" for purposes of the analyses of substantiality and market
impact. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. at 926.
57. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2250-51 (1985)
(finding that a small quantity of the work can constitute the "heart" of the work and weigh
against fair use).
58. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1233, 1243.
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signaled as evidence of the qualitative substantiality of the excerpt instead
bolsters the defense that the institution took no more than appropriate to the
pedagogical task.
In any event, the court's treatment of the fourth factor, the effect on the
potential market for or value of the work, arguably rendered irrelevant its
analysis of the amount and substantiality of the copying, apart from its
determination that the copyrighted "works" at issue were the whole books in
which the copied excerpts appeared. The court viewed the danger of market
substitution as the principal concern under this factor, and set the
substitution threshold at ten percent of the book as a whole. The court in
effect created a bright-line presumption in favor of fair use if the defendant
copied no more than ten percent of the pages of a book containing fewer
than ten chapters, or up to but not more than one chapter of a book with ten
or more chapters.6'
Whatever the merits of the ten-percent free pass, the court's treatment of
excerpts in excess of ten percent suggests a useful approach of broader
potential application, as we will see in subsequent sections of this article. The
court acknowledged the significance of the market for licensing excerpts
(even if the full book supplies the reference point for the quantum of
copying), and the deleterious impact on the value of the work were licensing
fees to go unpaid. But the court concluded that "[fjor loss of potential license
revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for
excerpts of the works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and
that they offered excerpts in a format which is reasonably convenient for
users."6 2 Otherwise the unlicensed use would likely be ruled fair. For many of
the works at issue, the court concluded that the record did not establish that
licenses for digital copies of the works were available in 2009 when the
defendants put the excerpts at issue on electronic reserve. Where "digital
permissions were not shown to be available," the court ruled that the
defendants' use "caused no actual or potential damage to the value of the
books' copyrights."" Where digital permissions were available, by contrast,
the court ruled that the fourth factor would weigh heavily against fair use.
61. Author's note: the Eleventh Circuit reversed the imposition of a 10% presumption,
ruling that it lacked statutory basis, and that all factors must be weighed together. Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
62. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
63. Id. at 1238. Author's Note: the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court "did not
err" in this aspect of its fourth factor analysis. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton,
769 F.3d 1232. 1281. (11th Cir. 2014)
64. The court accordingly found five instances of use it deemed not "fair." See also
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154
(N.D. Ga. August 10, 2012) (relief for five instances of copyright infringement).
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In other words, the court instituted a "license it or lose it" system. Or, more
accurately, the court gave ten percent off the top to the educational
institution (this is the social-welfare subsidy) and then imposed a solution
akin to a compulsory license. Except that where compulsory licenses in
copyright have traditionally been creatures of legislation, with government-
set rates, here the court in effect compelled the copyright owners to license,
lest the use be allowed for free, but left the rate-setting to the parties, subject,
perhaps, to judicial verification that the licenses "are easily accessible [and]
reasonably priced."" We will return to "license it or lose it" when we address
copyright exceptions for distribution uses in other countries, and in our
proposals for U.S. copyright reform.
c) Library Uses
Library uses present another instance of social-subsidy fair use. Unlike
educational photocopying (whose partial "Guidelines" appear in an appendix
to the report of the House Judiciary Committee), specified types of library
copying received explicit statutory coverage in section 108 of the 1976 Act.
Section 108, however, was drafted with such specificity that, despite some
updating in 1998, it has failed to keep pace with digital technologies." Section
108 nonetheless points to further flexibility by cautioning that "[n]othing in
this section ... in any way affects the rights of fair use as provided by section
107... ".
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust8 tested the relationship between the two
provisions. The Second Circuit announced a broad fair use privilege to create
and store digital copies of entire books for purposes of "data mining" of full
text and to enable access to the contents of books by the visually impaired.
The Second Circuit rejected the authors' contention that the constraints
contained within section 108, notably disallowing "systematic"
reproductions, limited the scope of fair use.6 ' The court addressed the two
uses separately. Looking at the output of data in response to search queries
rather than the input of the full contents of books into the database, the
court found the data-mining uses "quintessentially transformative ... . we
65. Cambridge, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
66. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT, at i
(2008) ("Due to the rapid pace of technological and social change, the law embodies some
now-outmoded assumptions about technology, behavior, professional practices, and
business models.").
67. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2012).
68. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), afg 902 F. Supp. 2d
445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
69. Id. at 94 n.4.
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can discern little or no resemblance between the original text and the results
of the H[athiTrust] D[igital] L[ibrary] full-text search." 0 Not only did the
data mining uses not generate any output of copyrightable expression, but
the nature of the use corresponded to a purpose entirely different from those
covered by more conventional uses: "There is no evidence that the Authors
write with the purpose of enabling text searches of their books.
Consequently, the full-text search function does not supersede[l the objects
[or purposes] of the original creation." The second and third factors were
quickly dispatched: the nature of the copied work was "not dispositive," and
the amount and substantiality of the copying corresponded to the purpose of
the copying, which was to reproduce the full text of the books.
The first-factor finding of "transformative use" essentially dictated the
court's analysis of the fourth factor, for "under Factor Four, any economic
'harm' caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses, by
definition, do not serve as substitutes for the original work."73 The court has
thus drawn the explicit conclusion suggested in earlier decisions in which it
indicated that a "transformative use" fills a transformative market, which did
not substitute for the work's usual markets.74 A "transformative use," then,
by definition exploits a non-traditional market. That the new market is one
that copyright owners might come to develop apparently does not matter;
the court gave short shrift to the authors' contended economic harm from
lost licensing opportunities.7 ' This dismissal of prospective markets can be
70. Id. at 97.
71. Id. (quoting Campbell v Acuff-Rose. 510 U.S. at 579) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
72. Id. at 98-99. On fair use and data mining, see generally, Matthew Sag, Orphan Works
as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012) (non-expressive uses of
copyrighted works do not infringe copyright).
73. Id. at 99.
74. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 , 614-15
(2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11
(2d Cir. 1998). Cf A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001)
("lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to
develop alternative markets for the works. See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5669, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1453, 1469-71 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that online
market for plaintiff newspapers' articles was harmed because plaintiffs demonstrated that
'[defendants] are attempting to exploit the market for viewing their articles online')").
75. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d at 100:
This theory of market harm does not work under Factor Four, because
the full-text search function does not serve as a substitute for the books
that are being searched. [Citations omitted] Thus, it is irrelevant that the
Libraries might be willing to purchase licenses in order to engage in this
transformative use (if the use were deemed unfair). Lost licensing revenue
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reconciled with the text of the fourth factor, which directs courts to consider
"the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work,"" if one concludes that the to-be-developed market is
normatively objectionable, as the Supreme Court had held in rejecting the
concept of a licensing market for parodies." The normative conclusion that
there is no market for the contested use, however, may be more apt for
productive uses that generate new works, particularly those critical of the
copied work, than for uses that entail unaltered copying of the entire work. If
the same conclusion pertains in the latter cases, the court has probably
concluded that the use should be allowed in any event; attaching the
"transformative" label to the use will determine the outcome of the market
harm inquiry: if the market is "transformative," there is no cognizable harm
because impairment to a transformative, as opposed to a traditional, market
doesn't count. Thus, if the use is "transformative," the four-factor statutory
test effectively reduces to a single factor.
The Second Circuit assessed the transformativeness of the use differently
with respect to the copying for access by the print-disabled. The district
court had held that the visually impaired formed an audience distinct from
the readers to whom the copyright owners marketed the books: "[P]rovision
of access for them was not the intended use of the original work (enjoyment
and use by sighted persons) and this use is transformative."78 Recognizing
that this rationale comes perilously close to suggesting that anytime a third
party develops a new audience for the work, distribution of the work to that
audience is "transformative," the Second Circuit reined in the enthusiasm of
the district court: "This is a misapprehension; providing expanded access to
the print disabled is not 'transformative.' . . . By making copyrighted works
available in formats accessible to the disabled, the HDL enables a larger
audience to read those works, but the underlying purpose of the HDL's use
is the same as the author's original purpose."7  But, the court went on,
"[w]hile a transformative use generally is more likely to qualify as fair use,
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use." 0
Copying for the print disabled still qualified as a fair use because the amount
of copying was commensurate to the task (factor three), and publishers do
counts under factor four only when the use serves as a substitute for the
original and the full text search use does not.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(40) (emphasis added).
77. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994).
78. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 2012).
79. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 101.
80. Id. at 101-02, quoting Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d
17, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not make their works available in blind-friendly formats, so there is no
cognizable market harm.8'
A perceived social imperative may well underlie the court's rather cavalier
treatment of the potential licensing markets with respect to both kinds of
use. The district court, in concluding its fair use analysis, declared:
I cannot imagine a definition of fair use that would not encompass
the transformative uses made by Defendants' M[ass] D[igitization]
P[roject] and would require that I terminate this invaluable
contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts
that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the
A[mericans with] D[isabilities] A[ct].
The Second Circuit eschewed the lower court's rhetorical flourishes, but
it surely perceived no lesser public benefit from the HathiTrust Digital
Library than did the S.D.N.Y. One should nonetheless note the district
court's assumption that were the fair use defense to fail, the libraries' socially
beneficial initiatives would have to be "terminated." If the choice is all-or-
nothing, a fair use outcome is assured. But, as the Georgia State ruling
suggests, the HathiTrust district court may have embraced a false dichotomy.
Admittedly, in Georgia State, a licensing mechanism, through the Copyright
Clearance Center, already existed, but it was not adequate to the task at the
time the electronic-reserves program began. The Georgia federal court's
ruling surely will provide the impetus to improve the licensing program so
that it does respond to the demand. HathiTrust does not even give licensing a
chance.
One might rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is fair," and
that indeed appears to be the approach of the Second Circuit. In other
words, HathiTrust appears to be a case in which the public benefit was so
compelling (and the market harm so trivialized) that the use should be free of
restraint and free of charge even if it could be licensed. But if the use is fair
because it supposedly cannot be reasonably licensed, then nipping licensing in
the bud deprives the author of compensation and gives the user an
81. "Transformativeness" thus appears to be a one-way ratchet: if the use is
transformative, it is highly likely to be deemed "fair," but there is no negative inference: non-
"transformative" uses may nonetheless be deemed "fair" as well.
82. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
83. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1148-49 (2000); Gordon,
supra note 13, at 1824-25. See generally Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require
Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2007). This objection, however, primarily arises
in the context of new works rather than new distributions.
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unwarranted free pass.84 This brings us to the second class of distribution
uses, characterized not by social benefit, but by "market failure."
B. MARKET-FAILURE/NEW-MARKET FAIR USE
"Market failure" may mean many things to many courts and
commentators. I am here using it in the sense proposed by Wendy J. Gordon
as "market malfunction" rather than what she calls "inherent limitation,"
which I understand to import a normative gloss: a market could function, but
policy reasons make such markets undesirable." When a large populace
engages in a multitude of non-creative uses, particularly in the digital
environment, the cost of seeking and paying for authorization may be
prohibitive for each potential user, so that enforcement of the copyright
might yield few sales and little advantage for the copyright owner. The public
interest (here equated with that of the user) in the new form of distribution
thus would be frustrated, with insufficient countervailing benefit to creators
(were there such a benefit, it would serve the long-term interest of the public
in ensuring that we "have a supply of good books"'). If "market failure"
primarily concerns practical inability to develop a paying market, a variant on
the theme of "market malfunction" is unwillingness to develop the market.
84. There may, however, be other justifications, such as solicitude for the visually-
impaired, to allow the use for free.
85. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 149, 151-53 (2003).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is a good example of an "inherent limitation": when the Court
announced there was "the law recognizes no derivative market for critical works, including
parody," it was making a normative, not an empirical, declaration. 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1993).
The Second Circuit's HathiTrust decision offers another example of "inherent limitation."
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cit. 2014).
86. 56 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3rd ser.) (1840) 346 (U.K.). Many commentators cite
Macaulay's characterization of copyright as an "exceedingly bad" "tax on readers for the
purpose of giving a bounty to writers," without acknowledging that in the same speech,
Macaulay also said:
The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is
desirable that we should have a supply of good books; we cannot have
such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated; and the least
objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of copyright. You
cannot depend for literary instruction and amusement on the leisure of
men occupied in the pursuits of active life. Such men may occasionally
produce pieces of great merit. But you must not look to them for works
which require deep meditation and long research. Such works you can
expect only from persons who make literature the business of their
lives. . . . Such men must be remunerated for their literary labour. And
there are only two ways in which they can be remunerated. One of those
ways is patronage [which Macaulay excoriated]; the other is copyright. Id.
at 346-47.
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While the exclusive rights copyright vests in authors normally entitle them to
decide whether and how to exploit their works, courts have on occasion
17
rejected infringement claims in order to allow the new market to emerge, or
in order to counter perceived copyright-owner abuse." (The two variants,
moreover, are not mutually exclusive, with the latter sometimes reinforcing
the former.') The examples I will consider are private copying and mass
digitization. Mass digitization in turn covers "orphan works," databases of
copyrighted works, of which Google's book-scanning program is the leading
instance, and image search engines.
1. Private Copying
As end users already, and will increasingly, enjoy copyrighted works of all
kinds through licensed access-based models, 0 the market-failure problem of
private copying may appear vestigial. "On demand" transmissions may
replace both retention and "time-shifting" copies, for there is no need to
"time shift" when one can receive the work at any time, and no need to
possess a copy if the content is accessible at will. (Indeed, given the evolution
of the hardcopy media in which works may be fixed, "cloud" accessibility
may be preferable to having to update one's collection, for example, from
recordable tape to burnable CDs to memory chips on portable devices, and
87. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. "Copyright trolling" occurs when the owners of copyrights (not the original
authors of the copyrighted works) bring infringement claims with the sole goal of profiting
through litigation, usually by forcing quick settlements. A notable example of a "troll" is
Righthaven, LLC, which has brought numerous infringement claims in recent years. See, e.g.,
Righthaven, LLC v. Va. Citizens Def. League, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-01683-GMN, 2011 WL
2550627 (D. Nev. June 23, 2011) (suing nonprofit group for posting article on website);
Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011) (suing individual
posting of copyrighted work in an online forum); Righthaven, LCC v. Jama, No. 2:10-CV-
1322 JCM (LRL), 2011 WL 1541613 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (suing nonprofit group as in
Va. CitiZens Def League, with court noting that use of copyright by plaintiffs "has been shown
to be nothing more than litigation-driven"). See also Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and
Presumptivey Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REv. 53, 111-14 (2014) (suggesting bad faith should
lead to a presumption of fair use).
89. According to a leading account of the business backstory to the Sony "Betamax
case," the studios were endeavoring to shut down the video tape recorder in favor of the
playback-only video-disk technology that the studios had licensed. See JAMES LARDNER,
FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 28-36
(1st ed. 1987).
90. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 113, 124-25 (2003).
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so on.) U.S. caselaw does not in any event support a general private copying
fair use exception for retention copies;" an exception does in effect exist for
analog copies of musical recordings,92 and another is in place for an
"additional copy or adaptation" copy of computer programs," but they are
the fruits of specific legislation, not fair use litigation. The Supreme Court in
Sony Corporation of America P. Universal City Studio 4 did, however, rule (on a
rather cursory, and now partly abandoned, analysis') that time shifting of
free broadcast television was a fair use. I will not here rehearse the reasoning
and critiques of Sony other than to observe that the five-Justice majority may
have perceived an all-or-nothing choice: extending fair use to copying entire
works for the same consumption purpose for which they were disseminated
was a significant departure from prior law (as the Ninth Circuit had
emphasized below), but limiting fair use to what was then called
"productive" use of limited portions of prior works could have meant
depriving the American public of a widely available and extremely popular
device whose use, five Justices concluded, was not harming the copyright
owners' television broadcast market." (As the dissent stressed, the majority
gave scant consideration to the new markets that time-shifting would
spawn.')
91. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (rejecting fair use defense for company engaged in creating digital readily accessible
copies of subscribers' CDs).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2012) (no infringement action "based on the noncommercial
use by a consumer of [an analog recording device] . . . for making . . . analog musical
recordings").
93. Id. § 117(a).
94. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
95. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Stor of Sony v. Universal Studios: MaU Poppins Meets the
Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358 (ane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006) (detailing the aspects of Sony from which the Court has
retreated, such as the predominant significance of commercial use, and those which retain
vitality, such as much of the contributory infringement analysis); Peter S. Menell & David
Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copynght liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's
De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007).
96. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("[T]he result of applying fair use to intrinsic use cases like Williams
& Wilkins Co. and this case is a fundamental restructuring of the copyright system not
justified by the statutory scheme or traditional notions of fair use."). The preamble to section
107, in identifying fair use purposes such as "teaching," included "multiple copies for
classroom use." While the copies did not yield new works, the classroom pedagogical use
could be deemed productive rather than "intrinsic")
97. Accord Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 439 (2008).
98. Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court has struggled
mightily to show that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copyrighted works in
their present markets. Even if true, that showing only begins the proper inquiry. The
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Given Sony's failure to blossom into a general fair use private copying
privilege," and the court's subsequent retreat from its emphasis on the
significance of commercial use, one may wonder whether Sony retains
relevance. Indeed, some have suggested that if the Court had it to do over
again today, it might come out differently, notably because video recorders
now offer playback without commercials.o Another reason to query the
continued persuasiveness of Sony's fourth-factor analysis (the only factor on
which the court bestowed any sustained analysis) is the burgeoning conflict
between time-shifting and video-on-demand. Fox Broadcasting v. DISH
Network"o' illustrates the conflict, and demonstrates how a well-advised
entrepreneur can structure its copyright-dependent technology in order to fit
a new business model within fair use boundaries even in the absence of the
usual normative or market-failure justifications.
Dish Network, a satellite TV transmission service which retransmits
television programming under license, offers its customers the Hopper, a set-
top box with both digital video recording and video-on-demand capabilities.
Dish's "PrimeTime Anytime" ("PTAT") feature allows subscribers to set a
single timer on the Hopper to record and store on the Hopper all primetime
programming on any of the four major broadcast networks each night of the
week. Finally, Dish's AutoHop feature enables users to skip commercials in
PTAT recordings. Fox charged Dish with direct and contributory
infringement. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim of direct infringement, on
the (dubious)"' ground that only the user "made" the PTAT copies.' 03 Fox's
development of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced by the
Studios."). See also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1620-23 (1982).
99. Or to impel legislation generally to authorize but provide compensation for private
audio and video copying, apart from a very specific and largely obsolete law on digital audio
tape recorders. See 17 U.S.C., § 1001-10 (2012). That said, the popular practice of making
media-shifting copies of copies lawfully acquired, for example, by ripping music from CDs
to load onto one's iPhone, or to store in one's "cloud," has become so widespread that it
may have become de facto fair use. That the practice may not yet be de jure fair use may be
ascribed to apparent reluctance on the part of the copyright owners to challenge it. The
Supreme Court, in ABC v. Aereo, appears to view a user's posting a copy of a work to her
cloud storage to come within her possessory relationship to the copy. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc.
v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
100. See, e.g., Michael A. Einhorn, Internet Television and Copyright Licensing: Balancing Cents
and Sensibility, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2002); Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video
Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205 (2004); Ned Snow, The
TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commerials Violate Copyright Law?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27
(2006).
101. Fox Broad. Co. v. DISH Network, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
102. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright-Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive
Rights on the Ebb, 218 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 167, 215-29 (2008)
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contributory liability claim turned on a finding of primary infringement by
Dish's customers. Applying Sony, the Ninth Circuit determined that Dish's
customers were engaging in non-commercial fair use time-shifting. The
commercial-skipping feature, the court ruled, did not affect the analysis of
the economic impact of the copying, because the television producer was not
the copyright owner of the commercials.
Losing the commercials may well have had a deleterious impact, but the
court found that the harm did not derive from any act that infringed any
copyright of Fox's. Similarly, while Fox licensed its programming to other
on-demand services such as Hulu, with which Dish's service competed, "the
ease of skipping commercials, rather than the on-demand availability of Fox
programs, causes any market harm. And as we have discussed, the
commercial-skipping does not implicate any copyright interest." 104
This astoundingly obtuse analysis recalls the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Visa International Service Assodaion,"' in which the panel majority (over Judge
Kozinski's trenchant dissent) granted the credit-card-payment provider's
motion to dismiss a contributory infringement claim on the ground that the
commission of the infringement did not require processing the payment. As
a matter of technology, it is true that the copies could be made and
distributed without the intervention of Visa. But, as Judge Kozinski stressed,
the pirate enterprise whose transactions Visa processed wouldn't be making
and distributing infringing copies if it couldn't be paid for it.' 6 In Dish
Network, the question should not have been whether Fox had any copyright
interest in the advertisements that the Dish customers copied but did not
view (indeed, imagine a version of AutoHop which recognizes commercials
(criticizing Second Circuit's analysis of who "makes" the copy). Cf Nat'1 Rugby League Invs.
Proprietary Ltd. v. Singtel Optus Proprietary Ltd., [2012] FCR 59 (Austl.) (rejecting Second
Circuit's analysis and finding provider of remote DVR service to have "made" the copy,
perhaps in conjunction with the end user).
103. The Supreme Court's decision in ABC v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014), did not
address the question of who "makes" an automated on-demand copy. The majority's analysis
of the public performance right concluded that Aereo "performed" the broadcast television
programming that it retransmitted to its subscribers via personalized antennas and
individualized streams of the digitized signal. The dissenters, adopting the "volition" analysis
propounded by the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008), had contended that the automated nature of Aereo's service should have
characterized Aereo as a mere provider of equipment enabling the subscribers to "perform"
the broadcast programs that the subscribers requested be retransmitted to their devices. To
the extent the majority's analysis can be read as rejecting the "volition" predicate to
determining "who performs" a copyrighted work, the analysis may also undermine a similar
prerequisite to determining "who copies" a work of authorship.
104. Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc., 723 F.3d at 1076.
105. Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 2007).
106. Id. at 817-19.
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and, instead of fast-forwarding through them, does not record them in the
first place; then, even if Fox had owned those copyrights, they would not
have been infringed precisely because the customers did not copy them;
nonetheless, the economic effect in all cases remains the same). What allows
free broadcast television (and Fox's free licensing to Hulu and other internet
services, provided they retain the ads) to be free are the advertisements; take
these away and the business model becomes unsustainable. The "value of the
work" accordingly diminishes as a result of the third-party copying and
commercial skipping.
Thus, while licensed on-demand transmissions may in general be
displacing private copying, entrepreneurs can, in effect, structure the enabling
of end-user time-shifting to afford most of the convenience of video-on-
demand (the selection of programming will not be infinite; it will be limited
to whatever is broadcast over the four networks in the course of a week)
without the pesky commercials (and, of course, without paying the copyright
owners). The operation is technically time-shifting; in "feel" to the consumer,
however, it is essentially video-on-demand, but better. Not only does the
time-shifting substitute for a licensed use (no "transformative purpose"
here), but there is no inability to license on-demand access. If there is a
justification for this outcome, it must be in the court's perception that
business models to facilitate time-shifting that free customers from
commercials are desirable and should not be suppressed by copyright owners
who will not license commercial-free retransmissions. (Either that, or the
following wooden syllogism: end-user non-commercial time-shifting via
video tape recorder is fair use; the DVR and AutoHop offer time-shifting
updated for the digital age; therefore their use is fair use too.)
2. Mass Digiigaion
Mass digitization does, at least at first blush, appear to present intractable
transaction-cost problems. The number of works at issue, and the difficulty
of locating their rightsholders (and even if located, obtaining the necessary
rights), may make free fair use seem a desirable solution, even for copying
and communication of entire works. The proposition does, however,
produce an obvious anomaly: the fewer works one copies, the weaker the
case for market-failure fair use; but vast, immodest, copying entitles the
copyist to persist, without permission and without paying. Closer
examination, moreover, suggests that the volume of copying, standing alone,
does not suffice for a free pass, though difficulties in rightsholder location
may justify a flexible solution. In either event, if the use is to be permitted, in
many instances it should also be paid.
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a) Orphan Works
The problem of "orphan works" by now is well known: would-be users
who are unable to locate the copyright owner, but whose use or exploitation
would not qualify for a copyright limitation or exception (such as fair use),
must decide whether to renounce their projects or to incur the risk that the
copyright owner will reappear once the exploitation is underway and demand
both injunctive and substantial monetary relief in an ensuing infringement
action. Potentially frustrated users range widely, from commercial entities
who seek to reissue out-of-print works or to create new works based on
orphan works, to cultural institutions, notably museums and libraries, who
seek to digitize works for preservation and educational purposes,o' to
individuals who seek to incorporate an orphan work in their webpage or
blog. The former U.S. Register of Copyrights deemed the orphan works
problem "pervasive." 0 8
When the Copyright Office first embarked on solving the problem of
orphan works in 2005, the premise of its inquiry was that the use would
107. The European endeavors concerning orphan works have taken place primarily in
the context of the Commission's "i2010 initiative" on digital libraries. See Communication from
the Commission of 30 September 2005 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, i2010: digital libraries COM (2005) 465 final
(Sept. 30, 2005); Commission Recommendation on the Digitisation and Online Accessibiliy of Cultural
Material and Digital Preservation, 2006 O.J. (L 236) 28 recital 10, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/activities/digital-libraries/doc/recommendation/
recommendationaugust06/en.pdf.
108. See The "Orphan Works" Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, H Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. Sess. 2 (2008)
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html:
In fact, the most striking aspect of orphan works is that the frustrations
are pervasive in a way that many copyright problems are not. When a
copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users
abandon important, productive projects, many of which would be
beneficial to our national heritage. Scholars cannot use the important
letters, images and manuscripts they search out in archives or private
homes, other than in the limited manner permitted by fair use or the first
sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or publish obscure
materials that have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in
their creation of exhibitions, books, websites and other educational
programs, particularly when the project would include the use of multiple
works. Archives cannot make rare footage available to wider audiences.
Documentary filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts, images,
sound recordings and other important source material from their films.
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involve more copying, particularly as a result of digital media, than fair use
could bear (for example, republication of whole books).' 9 Analysis therefore
turned to remedies: might these be structured in a way that encouraged the
reuse of orphan works by lowering the (by definition, infringing) user's risk
of substantial monetary exposure?"o More recently, however, some
commentators have argued that the difficulty of locating the rightsholder
should enter, and favor, the fair use calculus, so that the user owes no
damages should the rightowner reappear."' Orphan works regimes (this
Article will consider the ones in effect in the European Union and Canada in
Part II) do not spare their beneficiaries transaction costs. They may in effect
cap them, but by requiring that the would-be exploiter accomplish a "diligent
search" for rightsholders, orphan works regimes in fact mandate potentially
significant expenditures in location costs. As a result, an orphan works
regime, whether based in unpaid fair use (which may raise issues of
compliance with international standards for permissible exceptions"), or
modifying remedies (essentially a form of permitted-but-paid, at least for
exploitations occurring before the copyright owner's reappearance), or
requiring payment to a fund on behalf of the missing rightowner (with
escheat to local cultural initiatives should the rightowner not reappear after a
certain time) is not an answer to the transactions costs problem of mass
digitization. Mass digitization involves wholesale copying; orphan works
regimes operate at retail. Whether for free, or permitted-but-paid, the
justification for an orphan works exception lies not in a response to
transaction costs, but rather in the public benefit of the reuse, particularly if
the beneficiaries of the exception are nonprofit educational and library
institutions.
109. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 4 (2006) ("For purposes of developing a legislative solution
we have defined the 'orphan works' situation to be one where the use goes beyond any
limitation or exemption to copyright, such as fair use.").
110. Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008) (see also S. 2913, 110th
Cong. (2008)). See Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright--Part I, Legislative
Developments: Orphan Works, 217 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 99 (2008),
available at http://sr.nellco.org/columbia/pHt/papers/08152/ [hereinafter RIDA].
111. See, e.g., Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012) (for libraries and archives).
112. Berne Convention, supra note 11 at art. 9(2); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see Reply Comments on "Orphan
Works" Inquiry, Sent by Profs. Jane C. Ginsburg and Paul Goldstein to Copyrght Office Notice of Inquit
10 (May 9, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/reply/OWR107-
Ginsburg-Goldstein.pdf; RIDA, supra note 110.
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b) Databases of Copyrighted Works
True mass digitization, by contrast, can confront the large-scale user with
the typical transaction costs conundrum: even where a diligent (or even not-
so-diligent) search could locate the rightsholder, the cost of clearing rights
can exceed the benefit of being able to use the work. But these costs should
not be overstated. The problem is primarily transitional; for works currently
in commerce or disseminated with some form of copyright management
information, rightsholders can be found and their terms and conditions
known. (Actually having to pay known rightsholders, albeit a "transaction
cost," is not one that should excuse a commercial actor-user.)
As to in-copyright, out-of-commerce works (some of which may be
"orphans"), the Google Book scanning controversy raises a variety of issues.
With the rejection of the class action settlement that would have allowed
display of substantial portions of the books' text,1 4 Google's program and
concomitant fair use defenses shrank to providing bibliographic information
and displays of "snippets" (2-3 lines) of text in response to user search
queries, as well as access to the database of scanned books for purposes of
data mining. Google still retains the scanned full text of millions of in-
copyright books, but the "output" its users encounter either eschews
copyrightable expression or consists of very short extracts. Google had also
sought to bolster its fair use argument by invoking a variant of the
transaction-costs problem. In this instance, "diligent search" costs were not
involved: Google made no pretense of endeavoring to find rightsholders of
out-of-commerce books. Rather, it urged that the sheer number of
rightsholders implicated by the mass digitization made ex ante rights
clearance unduly onerous. Accordingly, Google contended that the burden
should be on the rightsholders to object to Google's use, not on Google to
obtain their accord. And in what some might consider adding insult to injury,
Google contended that its program should be deemed a fair use because
rightsholders had the opportunity to "opt out." 5
Arguably, the "opt out" feature was a diversion (albeit a portentous one
for the future conceptualization of copyright), and in any event seems to
have dropped out of the litigation by the time Judge Chin issued his opinion
on November 14, 2013. The relevant question should have been whether to
113. This proposition may need to be qualified with regard to non-commercial actors:
the Georgia State case suggests that failure to provide a reasonably priced license could make
the copyright owner vulnerable to a successful fair use defense.
114. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
115. For a discussion of the Google Books controversy, see James Grimmelman, THE
PUBLIC INDEX, http://www.thepublicindex.org/.
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focus exclusively on the probably non-infringing outputs, or to concentrate
on the creation and maintenance of a massive full-text commercial database.
The Southern District of New York's HathiTrust decision was an encouraging
precedent for the former approach; although unlike the library consortium,
Google is not an eleemosynary institution, and it is not apparent that it
requires a social subsidy of the sort that benefits nonprofit libraries.
Nonetheless, there is a powerful argument that exploiting a work for its non-
expressive information (bibliographic or bean-counting-how many times
and in what works a given word or phrase appears) should not even be
prima-facie infringing, and the creation of a database that enables non-
expressive, but progress-of-knowledge-enhancing, outputs must be equally
free. But this proves too much: under U.S. law, a library, including a
commercial library, is fully entitled to lend the books it owns; the first sale
doctrine precludes any copyright claim."' But the library is not entitled to
acquire the lending copies without paying for them (or receiving them as a
gift). What Google does, or enables others to do, with the outputs may not
be infringing, but those uses should not have obscured the inputs."'
Judge Chin, however, focused almost exclusively on the outputs,
effectively bootstrapping the inputs in one sentence: "as one of the keys to
Google Books is its offering of full-text search of books, full-work
reproduction is critical to the functioning of Google Books." That
functioning Judge Chin celebrated as "highly transformative," thus following
the now-rampant use of the term to bless uses of entire works in the
perceived public interest."'
The use of book text to facilitate search through the display of
snippets is transformative... . Google Books thus uses words for a
different purpose-it uses snippets of text to act as pointers
directing users to a broad selection of books. Similarly, Google
Books is also transformative in the sense that it has transformed
book text into data for purposes of substantive research, including
data mining and text mining in new areas, thereby opening up new
116. See 17 U.S.C. 5 109(a) (2012) (owner of lawfully made copy may resell or lend that
particular copy).
117. HathiTrust's reliance on the "intermediate copying" ground for fair use is not fully
persuasive, even for non-commercial entities. Three salient differences with intermediate
copying fair use cases such as Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522-28
(9th Cir. 1992): the copies there were generated as a necessary part of the copyist's creation
of a new and independent work; the copyist did not retain the copy; and the information
needed to create the new work could not be ascertained in other ways.
118. But see the Second Circuit's mild corrective in Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
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fields of research. Words in books are being used in a way they
have not been used before.
Google Books has created something new in the use of book
text-the frequency of words and trends in their usage provide
substantive information.
Google Books does not supersede or supplant books because it is
not a tool to be used to read books. Instead, it "adds value to the
original" and allows for "the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings. 1 9
On the question of the impact of Google's copying on the potential
market for plaintiffs' books, Judge Chin, perhaps surprisingly, embraced the
long-spurned argument that defendant's copying does the plaintiff a favor by
bringing the work to greater public attention.12
[A] reasonable factfinder could only find that Google Books
enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright holders. An
important factor in the success of an individual title is whether it is
discovered-whether potential readers learn of its existence.
Google Books provides a way for authors' works to become
noticed, much like traditional in-store book displays. Indeed, both
librarians and their patrons use Google Books to identify books to
purchase. Many authors have noted that online browsing in general
and Google Books in particular helps readers find their work, thus
increasing their audiences. Further, Google provides convenient
links to booksellers to make it easy for a reader to order a book. In
this day and age of on-line shopping, there can be no doubt but
that Google Books improves books sales.121
Both district courts, in HathiTrust and Google Books, adopted the premise
that a rejection of the fair use defense will deprive the public of the benefits
of the defendant's program. But, does it follow that if the inputs are
infringing, the generation of non-infringing outputs must be "terminated"
unless the inputs are licensed? In a post-eBayl22 remedial landscape, it is not at
all clear that a court would award injunctive relief, particularly if it estimated
the measure of damages as the price of one copy of each book (for works
unregistered before the infringement) or at the low end of statutory damages
($750 per book for works registered pre-infringement). 23 We will consider in
119. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
120. On courts' previous failure to find this contention persuasive, see, e.g., Pierre N.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
121. Authors Guild, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
122. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
123. 17 U.S.C. §5 412, 504(c)(1) (2012).
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Part III whether, as a consequence of possible new-found judicial reluctance
to order injunctive relief, the proposed permitted-but-paid regime for certain
redistributive uses may already be evolving, particularly in failed fair use
cases.
c) Search Engines
This subsection considers a trio of decisions from California involving
mass copying of digitized images for inclusion in an image search engine and
thumbnail displays in response to search queries.124 The transaction cost
problems did not go to finding the right owner, whose locatable website the
search engine will have "crawled," but concerned the sheer volume of works.
The announced grounds of decision, however, have concentrated on the
public benefit and lack of economic impact of a "transformative use." 125
Because the purpose of the copying was transformative in that the purpose
of the original photo was "aesthetic," while the search engine use was
"informational," the search engine use did not substitute for the author's use
(though following the search engine's links could take one to clearly
substitutional pirate sitesl26). The rightowner had contended that the
thumbnail images displayed by the search engine competed with the
emerging market for downloading thumbnails to cellphones, but in Perfect 10
v. AmaZon the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove that
such a market was truly in prospect.127 Reminded that fair use is an
affirmative defense, and that the search engine bore the burden of showing
that its thumbnails did not compromise that market, the court amended its
opinion, but not the result,128 which suggests that the burden of proof did
not matter because the court had already determined the outcome: the public
benefit search engines offer required that the use be fair (and therefore
unpaid) one way or another.
124. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex, No. C 12-01521 WHA,
2013 WL 1899851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013).
125. The Perfect 10 court also characterized the index as a "work." Perfect 10 Inc. v.
Amaon, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165 ("[A] search engine provides social benefit by incorporating
an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.")
126. See, e.g., il. at 1154 (Google provided links to third-party websites that display
infringing full-size versions of Perfect 10's images).
127. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We note
that Perfect 10 has the burden of proving that it would defeat Google's affirmative fair use
defense").
128. Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1146 (noting amendment of decision on
December 3, 2007).
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III. COMPARATIVE LAW: EUROPEAN UNION, CANADA,
AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND
The United States is an outlier in the broader international landscape of
copyright exceptions. Neither the copyright laws of European Union
member states, nor of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, include an all-
purpose fair use defense (though one has been proposed in Australia), but all
these States have enacted a panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which
require remuneration. Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with
an all-or-nothing choice, other countries have charted middle courses
between barring the use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit. Some of
these measures correspond to specific compulsory licensees in U.S. law (for
example, for cable retransmission).' Others, however, cover some of my
proposed zone of permitted-but-paid uses. The various schemes range from
compulsory licenses with government rate-setting to "license it or lose it"
schemes in which an unremunerated exception will apply if the copyright
owner fails to offer a license. In the latter instance, the license will generally
cover a substantial number of works, and the licensor will generally represent
a collective of authors and publishers.
But, even with arm-twisting, licensing will work only to the extent that
the licensor has the rights to license. In the case of mass uses of works (as
the Google Books controversy has shown in the United States) there may be
no reasonably compassable number of rightsholder representatives,
particularly where copyright owners have not authorized a representative.
The European Nordic countries have addressed this transaction-cost
problem by imposing an "extended collective license" regime, in which the
works of unrepresented rightsholders will be brought within the collective
management society's licensing authority once the society has attained a
(legislatively specified) critical mass of rightsholders. More recently, the
French legislature in 2012 devised a Google-esque solution to mass book-
scanning, by combining an opt-out regime with collective licensing of the
digital rights of the remaining books designated by the national library for
scanning and republication. Collective management of the grant or
administration of the licenses ensures that the authors (and not merely the
publishers or other distribution intermediaries) will receive a share of the
licensing revenue.
129. See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 135 (as amended) (Austl.); Copyright Act R.S.C.
2012, c.C-42, art. 31 (Can.); Consolidated Act on Copyright § 35 (2010) (Den.); Copyright
and Related Rights Act 2000 (as amended) (Act. No. 28/2000) 5 175 (Jr.); Section 88 of the
Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs, Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, 5 73
(as amended) (U.K.).
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Finally, with respect to "orphan works" whose rightsholders cannot be
found despite a diligent search, the European Union and Canada authorize
certain uses by certain classes of users; in Canada, permission may be
obtained through a designated licensing authority. These regimes have also
addressed the compensation due to those rightsholders who subsequently
reappear. This section of the article will summarize current regimes and
pending law-reform measures abroad that might inspire a permitted-but-paid
regime in the United States.
The regimes may be divided as follows: 1. License it or lose it; 2. Use
permitted; remuneration required; 3. French Law on "Unavailable Books"; 4.
Orphan works.
A. LICENSE IT OR LOSE IT
"License it or lose it" offers one response to the transaction costs
problem of large-scale use of copyrighted works. The use in question will fall
under a statutorily specified unremunerated exception unless there is a
collective license in place for the use and, usually, if the user was reasonably
aware of the licensing scheme. In effect, it places the burden on the
copyright owners to organize collective licensing of certain uses by making
them uncompensated otherwise. The United Kingdom and New Zealand
currently follow this approach in certain contexts, and some have been
proposed for Australia. In the existing schemes and in the proposed scheme,
these exceptions are explicitly enumerated in the statute and noted to be
unremunerated only in the absence of a licensing scheme. Some of the
exceptions, particularly for cable retransnssions and for certain uses for the
benefit of the visually impaired, address uses which are currently the subject
of compulsory licensing or an outright exemption in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, the scheme includes the following uses:1o
1) recording certain broadcasts or copies of broadcasts for placement in
nonprofit archives; educational establishments recording broadcast or
copies of broadcasts for non-commercial educational purposes;
2) specially designated bodies making copies of broadcasts for deaf,
hard of hearing, and handicapped with subtitled modifications as
needed; and
3) making copies and published editions for personal use of visually
impaired, including Braille editions and spoken word recordings.
130. Copyright, Designs, Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, 55 31, 35, 74 (as amended) (U.K.).
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New Zealand:' 3'
1) copying sound recording for instruction or relating to learning a
language by correspondence and copying done by person giving or
receiving lesson and no charge is made for supplying copy;
2) copying and communication of a "communication work"'3 2 made or
communicated by or on behalf of or made and supplied by an
educational resource supplier for an educational purpose;
3) official archives playing or showing films or sound recordings so long
as payment to view/hear no more than a reasonable contribution
toward maintenance of archive;
4) media monitors recording or transcribing communication work that
consists wholly or substantially of news reports or discussions of
current events if conditions met (parties negotiate or government sets
rate but this does not apply if there is a licensing scheme in place);
and
5) cable retransmission of communication works.
The proposed changes to Australia's copyright legislation 33 include
replacement of certain statutory licenses with either negotiated licenses or a
newly introduced, U.S.-inspired unpaid fair use exception. Existing statutory
licensing schemes currently in place for governments, educational
institutions, and institutions assisting persons with a print disability would all
be repealed. Under the proposed new scheme, these licenses should be
negotiated voluntarily. However, institutions would not need to negotiate
licenses for uses that the parties or the courts considered to be fair use.
B. USE PERMITTED; REMUNERATION REQUIRED
Here, an author may not prohibit specific enumerated uses, but she is
entitled to equitable remuneration for these uses. In most instances, a
collecting society is responsible for collecting and distributing remuneration
and often is the only party who may assert a claim. The key issue, of course,
is how the remuneration is set. National legislation discloses three variants on
the theme: 1) private parties (usually collecting societies) voluntarily set the
remuneration rate; 2) private parties set the remuneration rate but the
131. Sections 44, 48, 57, 88, and 91 of the Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) (N.Z.).
132. A "communication work" includes "radio and TV broadcasts and Internet
transmissions, separate from the films, music and other material which they contain." An
introduction to copyright in New Zealand, COPYRIGHT COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND 2 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.copyright.org.nz/viewInfosheet.php?sheet=29.
133. Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], Copynght and the Digital Economy, in
ALRC REPORT 122 (Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter ALRC Report].
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government steps in to determine the rate when the private parties can't
agree; and 3) government requires users to obtain licenses from collecting
societies. The following is not exhaustive: it covers only some European
Union member states and lists only those exceptions that do not correspond
to a compulsory license already present in U.S. law. 134 Cumulatively, the
categories suggest the kinds of uses that might populate a U.S. permitted-but-
paid regime.
1. Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate
Austria:
In Austria, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration that may only
be asserted by a collecting society for the following uses:135
1) reproducing and distributing published individual literary works to
extent justified by purpose (e.g., churches, schools) and also
broadcasts designated to be school broadcasts;
2) reproducing and distributing individual published works which by
nature and designation are intended for use in schools or teaching;
3) libraries using video or audio media for public recitation,
performance, or presentation of works for no more than two visitors
at a time and not for profit;
4) schools and higher educational establishments publicly performing
cinematographic works for purposes of teaching to extent justified
(but does not apply to works intended for teaching); and
5) accommodation enterprises publicly showing cinematographic works
to guests provided that more than two years have elapsed since
work's first performance, performance carried out with aid of
permitted audio or video medium, and spectators admitted free of
charge.
Finland: 136
In Finland, the author has a right to remuneration for the following uses:
1) reproducing published works by means other than sound and moving
images for those who cannot use the works in the ordinary manner
134. I do not here address private copying levies.
135. URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [COPYRIGHT ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLAr [BGBL No.
58/2010, 5 45, 51, 54(1)(3), 56(b)-(c) (Austria).
136. Copyright Act §5 17-18 (1961) (as amended) (Fin.).
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due to disability or illness (but government issues decree on which
institutions are entitled to make copies to lend, sell, or use); and
2) reproducing minor parts of short published literary or artistic works
for use in educational compilation after required years have elapsed
since publication (but does not apply to works created for use in
education).
Germany:3
In Germany, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration, which in
most instances may only be asserted by a collecting society, for the following
uses:
1) reproducing work for non-commercial purposes for exclusive
distribution to persons with disabilities if reproduction is necessary
for such access;
2) reproducing, distributing, and making available published works in
non-commercial basic and further training facilities, vocational
training facilities, or for church use (but must communicate intent to
author or rights holder);
3) reproducing, distributing, and communicating newspaper articles and
broadcast commentaries and connected illustrations in newspapers
and similar information sheets (but not required if short extracts of
several articles or commentaries used for overview);
4) publicly performing published work to public if serves non-profit-
making purpose of event organizer, participants admitted free of
charge, and performers unpaid (but not required to pay for events
organized by youth, social welfare, geriatric, or prisoner's welfare);
and
5) public libraries reproducing and transmitting small parts of published
articles by post or fax (but limitations on electronic reproduction).
Lithuania:...
In Lithuania, the author is entitled to remuneration through compulsory
licenses that are administered and distributed by the appropriate collecting
society for the following uses:
137. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Act], July 16, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLAr
[BGBL], as amended, 5§ 45(a), 46, 49(1), 52, 53(a) (Ger.).
138. Law on Copyrights and Related Rights (as amended) Art. 23 (1999) (Lith.).
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1) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes published
articles or other short work, short extract of writing with or without
illustrations; and
2) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes work kept
in publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums,
or archives, except when over the Internet, for purpose of
replacement of a lost, destroyed, or unfit-for-use copy in own or
other archive or library if impossible to obtain by other means.
Netherlands:'
In the Netherlands, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for
the following uses:
1) libraries and educational institutions making copies of printed works
for their library services and for students;
2) use for the benefit of people with a disability if the use is non-
commercial and related to the disability.
Norway:14 0
In Norway, the author is entitled to remuneration for the following uses:
1) copying published work for educational purposes for use in public
examinations;
2) reproducing collective work for use in religious services or education
or minor parts of literary/scientific works or musical works or short
works if five years have elapsed since the expiry of the year in which
the work was published;
3) reproducing published works of art and photos in connection with
the text of a critical or scientific treatise which is not of a generally
informative character (limitation is not applicable to photographs) in
accordance with proper usage and to extent necessary to achieve
desired purpose; and
4) reproducing published works of art and photos in newspapers,
periodicals, and broadcasts in connection with reporting a current
event (but does not apply if the current event is related to the work
that is reproduced).
139. Wet van 23 september 1912, houdende nieuwe regeling van het auteursrecht [Act
of Sept. 23, 1912, Containing New Regulation for Copyright], Stb. (as amended) Arts. 16h,
15j, 26a (Neth.).
140. Copyright Act (as amended) §§ 13(a), 18, 23, 23(a) (1961) (Nor.).
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Poland:14 1
In Poland, the author must be paid remuneration for the following uses:
1) including excerpts from larger works or entire small works in
textbooks and in anthologies that are collections of excerpts for
scientific or educational purposes;
2) centers for scientific and technical information distributing single
copies of excerpts from published works; and
3) reproducing published works of fine art in encyclopedias and atlases
when attempts to contact copyright owners for permission encounter
serious obstacles.
Spain:142
In Spain, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration for the
following use:
1) reproducing, distributing, and communicating works disseminated in
mass-media studies and articles on current events (unless rights
expressly reserved).
Sweden:143
In Sweden, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the
following uses:
1) using by and for the disabled beyond specifically exempted
thresholds; and
2) distributing more than a few copies or communicating or distributing
copies and recordings that disabled persons can retain.
a) Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate; Copyright Tribunals Set
Rate If Parties Cannot Agree
141. Act on Copyright and Related Rights (as amended) Arts. 29.2, 30.2, 33.3 (1994)
(Pol.).
142. Revised Law on Intellectual Property Art. 33.1 (R.D.L. 1996, 1) (as amended)
(Spain).
143. 17 ch. LAG OM UPPHovsRATI TILL LITERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk
forfattningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.).
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Australia:1"
In Australia, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot
agree on a rate for the following uses:
1) reproducing articles or reasonable portion of published or
unpublished works in electronic form by educational institutions,
including visual art alongside text;
2) reproducing published literary and dramatic works for the research,
study or instruction of a person with a print disability, including in
electronic form;
3) copying to assist persons with intellectual disabilities if material is not
commercially available; print disability license holders broadcasting
published literary and dramatic works and adaptations;
4) qualifying institution copying a broadcast, or any work, sound
recording, or film in a transmission for education for the disabled;
5) performing sound recordings in places open to the public.
Denmark:145
In Denmark, the Copyright License Tribunal sets the' rate if private
parties cannot agree on a rate for the following uses:
1) use of published sound recordings in broadcasts on radio and
television and other public performances (but excluding on-demand
Internet transmission);
2) non-commercial use and distribution of copies of published works
specifically intended for the blind, visually impaired, deaf, and
sufferers of speech impediments, including sound recordings of
literary works for visually impaired (but no other sound recordings of
literary or musical works); and
3) use of minor portions of literary and musical works or such works of
small proportions and works of art in connection with the text in
composite works compiling contributions by a large number of
authors for use in educational activities provided that five years have
elapsed since the work was published.
Italy:146
144. CopyightAct 1968 (Cth) §5 108, 135 (as amended) (Austl.)
145. Consolidated Act on Copyright §§ 17(1)-(3), 18 (2010), 68 (Den.).
146. Legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633, Arts. 46(3), 58, 51-59, 70(2), 60 (It.).
1421
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1383
In Italy, the rate is set based on criteria set out by the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the
following use:
1) reproducing protected works in anthologies for educational use.
New Zealand:147
In New Zealand, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate in if private parties
cannot agree on a rate for the following use:
1) librarian making copies of published editions for collections of other
libraries.
Sweden: 148
In Sweden, the court sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate
for the following use:
1) reproducing protected materials in compilations made and used for
educational purposes.
When the parties cannot agree, the state may resolve the rate through
national Copyright Boards or Tribunals. Generally speaking, Copyright
Tribunals seem to play the largest role in Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and Canada. In most instances, however, this role remains fairly
minor. In Australia, for example, parties generally agree on a rate amongst
themselves and so the Copyright Tribunal hears only approximately two
matters per year.149 Similarly in New Zealand, collecting societies set rates and
the Tribunal steps in only when the collecting society rate is challenged.
These challenges often result in interparty settlements and the Tribunal issues
a rate only if the matter goes to a full hearing, which rarely occurs.o In the
147. The Copyright Act of 1994, §§ 54, 63 (as amended) (N.Z.).
148. 18 ch. LAG OM UPPHovSRATr TILL LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk
forfattningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (Swed.).
149. Email correspondence with Paddy Hannigan, Deputy District Registrar, Australian
Copyright Tribunal to Olena Ripnick, research assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Feb. 9, 2014, 9:27
PM GMT/4:27 PM EST) (on file with author).
150. Email from Prof. Susy Frankel, President, N.Z. Copyright Tribunal, to Olena
Ripnick, research assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:26 PM GMT/8:26 AM EST)
(on file with author).
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United Kingdom, the Copyright Tribunal primarily confirms rates that
private parties have agreed upon themselves.'
The Copyright Board plays the largest role in rate setting in Canada, as
certain collecting societies are required by law to set tariffs for certain uses.
Here, the collecting society publishes the tariff and parties are given a chance
to object. If a party does not object, the tariff is confirmed. If a party does
object, the Copyright Board proceeds to a hearing, but during this process
parties frequently negotiate and agree on a rate amongst themselves and then
ask the Copyright Board to certify that rate six to twelve months later before
the matter goes to a full hearing. The Copyright Board sets the rate only
when the parties cannot come to an agreement amongst themselves. For uses
that are not required by law to have a tariff, parties generally negotiate
amongst themselves and may file the rate with the Copyright Board but are
not required to do so. On rare occasion, the Copyright Board may be asked
to act as an arbiter or set a tariff with regard to these uses.15
2. Government Requires License from Collecting Sodey-Extended Collectie
Licensing153
Since the early 1960s, the Nordic countries have facilitated the large-scale
licensing of works, generally for public purposes, by legislation that brings
works unrepresented by the relevant collecting society within the licensing
authority of that society. Some, but not all, of the statutory provisions allow
rightsholders to opt out of the collective license. Extended collective licenses
("ECL") have received considerable attention lately as a possible solution to
the orphan-works and mass-digitization problems.'5 4 Scholars from the
Nordic countries, however, have expressed skepticism that the approach can
be generalized to nations lacking the Nordic countries' particular traditions of
social organization."' Nonetheless, I summarize the laws' coverage in order
151. Email from Catherine Worley, U.K. Copyright Tribunal, to Olena Ripnick, research
assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Feb. 10, 2014 10:49 AM GMT/5:49 AM EST) (on file with
author).
152. Telephone Interview with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis,
Copyright Board Canada (Mar. 3, 2014).
153. See generally Gunnar Karnell, Extended Collective License Clauses and Agreements in Nordic
Copyrght Law, 10 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 73 (1985); Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended
Collective licenses and the Nordic Eperience: It's a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUMJ.
L. & ARTS 471 (2010).
154. See generally Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book Search
and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 229 (2011); David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United
States, 37 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013).
155. See Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 153, at 495-96.
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to give an idea of the kinds of uses these legislatures have determined should
be permitted-but-paid.
ECL uses fall into a number of similar categories. They are as follows:
1) educational uses;"s'
2) library and archive uses;"
3) internal uses in public and/or private organizations;5s
4) broadcasting published works;"5 '
156. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 13 (2010) (Den.) (copying published works and
recording works broadcast on radio and TV as well as own performance for educational
uses, but does not apply to computer programs or more than brief extracts from
cinematographic works); Copyright Act § 14 (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (reproducing,
making public and performing works for educational activities and scientific research);
Copyright Act (as amended) § 13(b) (1961) (Nor.) (copying published works and broadcasts
for educational activities, but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more than minor
parts of cinematographic work); 42c ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRATT TILL LITTERARA OCH
KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.))
(copying works that have been made public for educational purposes).
157. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 16(b) (2010) (Den.) (public libraries digitally
reproducing articles from newspapers, magazines, composite works, brief excerpts from
published literary works and illustrations and music reproduced in connection with the text
(but does not permit broadcast by radio or TV or the making available to the public of
works in such a way that the public may access them at the place and time of their choosing);
Copyright Act § 16(d) (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (archives, public libraries, museums
reproducing and communicating works for purposes not included in unremunerated
exceptions); Copyright Act (as amended) § 16(a) (1961) (Nor.) (libraries, archives, museums
copying and making available published works in their collections); 42d ch. LAG OM
UPPHOVSRATT TILL LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk f6rfattningssamling
[SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (libraries and archives communicating single articles
and short portions of works to library borrowers (but does not apply to computer programs)
and distributing copies of works prepared pursuant to library exception for purposes not
included in unremunerated exceptions).
158. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 14 (2010) (Den.) (public or private institutions,
organizations and businesses copying articles, brief excerpts of descriptive published works
or musical works and illustrations for internal use to advance their own activities); Copyright
Act § 13(a) (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (reproducing published article and accompanying
illustration for internal communication); Copyright Act § 14 (as amended) (1961) (Nor.)
(public and private institutions and organizations and commercial enterprises copying
published works and broadcasts for use within their own activities (but does not apply to
broadcasts that consist of more than minor parts of cinematographic work)); 42b ch. LAG
OM UPPHOVSRATT TILL LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk f6rfattningssamling
[SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (decision-making municipal assemblies, governmental
and municipal authorities, enterprises, and organizations copying published literary works
and works of fine art published in connection with the text by means of reprographic
reproduction in order to satisfy the need for information within their field of activities).
159. Consolidated Act on Copyright 5 30 (2010) (Den.) (public access television
companies broadcasting published works on radio or TV broadcast, but does not apply to
satellite unless there is a simultaneous terrestrial broadcast); Copyright Act 1961 (as
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5) television retransmission;1 6 0
6) fixations of broadcast works for the disabled; 61
7) reproducing published works of art;16 2 and
8) public access to specified public television programs at a time and
place chosen by the viewer.16 3
C. FRENCH LAW ON "UNAVAILABLE BOOKS"
The French legislature in March 2012 unanimously enacted a law on
"unavailable books,",161 which was designed to make the corpus of out-of-
amended) § 25(f)-(g) (Fin.) (broadcasting organization transmitting a work, copying a work
for up to a year to use in its own broadcast for a maximum of four times per year-and
potentially longer/more depending on terms of ECL-broadcasting organization
transmitting a new work made public if included in a TV program produced by the
broadcasting organization and transmitted before January 1, 1985); Copyright Act 1961 (as
amended) § 30 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations named by King broadcasting published
work); 42e ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRATT TILL LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk
f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (sound radio and television
organizations specified by government broadcasting public literary, musical, and fine art
works, but does not apply to works made for the stage and only applies to transmissions via
satellite if the broadcasting organization simultaneously carries out a broadcast through a
terrestrial transmitter).
160. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 35 (2010) (Den.) (simultaneous retransmission on
cable of works broadcast wirelessly on radio or television); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended)
§ 25(4) (Fin.) (retransmitting work included in radio or TV transmission for reception by the
public simultaneously with the original transmission); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) 5 34
(Nor.) (broadcast organizations using works that are lawfully included in a broadcast and
communicating to public by simultaneous and unaltered retransmission); 42f ch. LAG OM
UPPHOVSRATE TILL LITTERARA OCH KONSTNARLIGA VERK (Svensk f6rfattningssamling
[SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (transmitting or retransmitting to public,
simultaneously and in unaltered form, by wire or wireless means, works which form part of a
wireless sound radio or TV broadcast).
161. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 17(4) (2010) (Den.) (government, municipal, and
other social nonprofit institutions reproducing sound or visual recordings broadcast on TV
or radio in a manner accessible to visually handicapped and hearing-impaired people by
means of sound or visual recordings); Copyright Act (as amended) § 17(b) (1961) (Nor.)
(producing and using fixations for the disabled (and King may issue regulations regarding
right to make a fixation of published film or picture with or without sound not essentially
consisting of musical works)).
162. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 24(a) (2010) (Den.) (reproducing published works
of art); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) § 2 5(a)(2) (Fin.) (reproducing work of art in
collection or sale for purposes other than promoting the exhibition or sale).
163. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 30(a) (2010) (Den.) (public access to state-owned
television company productions at places and times selected by the viewer); Copyright Act
(as amended) § 32 (1961) (Nor.) (specific broadcasting organizations using issued works in
their collections and in connection with new broadcasts and transmissions in such a way that
individuals can choose time and place of access to the work (only applies to works broadcast
before January 1, 1997 that are part of broadcaster's own productions and author may
prohibit use)).
1425
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1383
print French books digitally available (and to offer a national alternative to
Google Books, whose scanning program the Paris trial court had, not
coincidentally, condemned as copyright infringement"). The law directs the
Bibliothque nationale de France to establish a database of all works
published in France before 2001 that are not available in print or digital
forms. The creation of the list of works derives from comparing the national
library's holdings with databases of commercially available books, but also
includes a crowd-sourcing component. Every year, the national library will
generate a new list.
The law vests management of the digital rights in a collecting society,
whose board is composed of equal numbers of authors and publishers. Once
the book is listed, authors and publishers have six months to oppose the
collecting society's management of the book. After six months, the author
may nonetheless oppose on the basis of harm to her honor or reputation. If
the publisher opposes, it has two years to exploit the book; the author incurs
no corresponding obligation. Thereafter, the collecting society is empowered
to exercise its right to authorize the reproduction and communication of the
book in digital form, by offering five-year renewable non-exclusive licenses,
subject to remuneration, to digitize and disseminate. The law, however, does
not detail how the remuneration will be calculated, other than to require that
it be "equitably" distributed between authors and publishers, and that the
author's share may not be less than the publisher's."
Absent opposition, the collecting society must first offer the original
print publisher a ten-year automatically renewable exclusive license to
reproduce and make the work available in digital form. The publisher has
two months to respond, and, if it exercises this right of first refusal, it has
three years to make the book available. If the publisher does not exercise the
right, or fails to publish digitally within three years, the collecting society will
offer non-exclusive digitization and dissemination licenses to all comers. The
author may oppose the grant of the exclusive license to the original print
164. Loi 2012-287 du 1 mars 2012 relative a l'exploitation numerique des livres
indisponibles du XXe siacle [Law 2012-287 of Mar. 1, 2012 on the Digital Exploitation of
Unavailable Books of the Twentieth Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 2, 2012 , p. 3986 (effective as of
the publication of d6cret no2013-182 of Feb. 27, 2013 on the application of articles L.134-1 a
L.134-9 of the Code of intellectual property). The French Constitutional Council recently
rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of this law. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 213-370 QPC, Feb. 28, 2014 (Fr.).
165. Tribunal de grande instance [ordinary court of original jurisdiction], Paris, 3e ch.,
Dec. 18, 2009 (Fr.), available at http://www.legalis.net/?page=jurisprudence-
decision&id article=2812.
166. CODE DE LA PROPRItTE INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L.134-3 II cl. 5 et seq. (Fr.)
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publisher if the author proves that the publisher did not acquire digital rights.
The author may at any time withdraw the collecting society's power to grant
non-exclusive digitization licenses if the author proves that he or she alone
held digitization rights. And authors and publishers may at any time jointly
withdraw the collecting society's power, but the publisher must exploit the
book within eighteen months. Any licenses the collecting society may already
have granted will continue in force for any remainder of the five-year period
covered by the grant.
In the case of so-called orphan books, the French law empowers the
collecting society to authorize publicly accessible libraries to digitize and
disseminate books in their collections, if after ten years from the inclusion of
the book in the collecting society's repertoire, the copyright holders have not
been found notwithstanding a diligent search. Libraries pay no remuneration
to the collecting society, but they must not derive any economic or
commercial benefit from digitizing and making the books available to the
public. 6 7
A few observations: first, the law does not create a free national digital
lending library. With the exception of orphan books, the law does not enable
libraries freely to digitize and disseminate out-of-print books. Libraries could
acquire non-exclusive licenses to do so, but the licenses must be paid for. On
the other hand, the cost of those licenses may well be considerably less than
the cost of negotiating rights from the copyright owners. It remains to be
seen whether libraries would undertake the outlay, and, if they did, whether
the free availability of digitized out-of-print books from libraries would
discourage for-profit publishers from entering the market.
Second, non-exclusive licenses for exercise by libraries or others will be
granted only if the publisher does not make the book available. Here, the
law's allocation of the respective rights of authors and publishers is
problematic, and, for France, surprising. During the first six months
following the book's inclusion on the Bibliothque nationale's database, both
authors and publishers may oppose the collecting society's exercise of
digitization rights. The objecting publisher, however, will have to exploit the
book within two years. But the publisher may not have acquired digital rights,
or the contract may be ambiguous as to the acquisition of rights over new
modes of exploitation. So, without making a deal with the author, the
publisher may not be in a position to oppose the collecting society's
167. Id. at L. 134-8, cl. 2 ("L'autorisation mentionnee au premier alinia est delivr& sous
r6serve que l'institution b6neficiaire ne recherche aucun avantage economique ou
commercial. [The license mentioned in the first clause is subject to the beneficiary institution
not seeking any economic or commercial advantage.]").
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administration of digital rights. On the other hand, if the publisher does not
oppose, the collecting society administers the rights but must first offer
them, on an exclusive basis, to the publisher who holds the print rights. In
other words, the law gives to the publishers what they may not have received
by contract. Ambiguity in the contract now favors the publisher. In a reversal
of the usual burden of proof regarding the scope of the author's grant of
rights, the law requires the author to demonstrate that she retained the rights,
rather than obliging the publisher to prove their acquisition. So why should
the publisher bother negotiating with the author for digital rights if the
publisher can get those rights by transfer of law? Arguably, this is
expropriation, and worse, the law expropriates authors not for the public
benefit of nonprofit libraries, but for the benefit of for-profit publishers. On
the other hand, the authors will be paid half the licensing revenue; without
the licensing scheme, the author would have derived no revenue from the
books that otherwise would have remained out of commerce.
The law has now been in effect long enough for the Bibliothbque
nationale to have published an initial list of 60,000 "unavailable" tides. 6' The
collecting society designated to administer the electronic rights in those
books has received only 2500 oppositions to the listings, mostly from
authors or publishers who claim an intention to publish a digital edition.'
Details concerning who undertakes the digitization, and at whose cost,
remain to be worked out, as does the rate-setting for the royalty to be paid to
authors. And it is still too early to ascertain how many of the original
publishers will take up the collecting society's invitation to prepare a digital
edition.
The law, conceived as France's answer to Google,o goes a step beyond
Nordic-style extended collective licenses because it vests the management
168. FLORENCE-MARIE PIRIou, LEGICOM, LE LIVRE NUMERIQUE: UNE REVOLUTION
JURIDIQUE EN MARCHE? [Legicom Digital Books: a Judicial Revolution Underway?] (2014).
169. Email to Jane Ginsburg from Florence Marie Piriou, Deputy Director of Sofia, the
collecting society empowered to administer the licenses for "unavailable books" (Oct. 7,
2013, 10:26 AM) (on file with author).
170. See, e.g., Franck Macrez, L'exploitaion numbique des livres indisponibles : que reste-t-il du
droit d'auteur ? [Digital exploitation of unavailable books: what's left of copyright?], FRANCK
MACREZ (Apr. 3, 2012), http://franck.macrez.net/?p=210 (the solution that was adopted
seeks to give new life to a currently neglected corpus, and to respond to the desire for
massive digitization inspired by Google); Societ6 nationale de l'dition, Numbisation des livres
indisponibles [Digitization of unavailable books], SYNDICAT NATIONAL DE L'EDITION (Mar. 1
2012), http://www.sne.fr/dossiers-et-enjeux/numerique/numerisation-des-livres-indisponib
les.html (genesis of the law was to respond to Google Books' digitization strategy); see also
Lionel Maurel, De la lo sur les indisponibles au registre ReLIRE: la blessure, I'insulte el la riaction en
marche [From the law on unavailable books to the ReLire registry: the injury, the insult, and
the unfolding reaction] (Mar. 24, 2013), http://scinfolex.com/2013/03/24/de-la-loi-sur-les-
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authority in a collecting society without requiring the society to demonstrate
that it already represents most or even some of the rightsholders. Although
the collecting society exercises a "mandate" or "authorization to manage,""
it is not the rightsholders who delegate this authority (as with conventional
collecting societies), but the State that confers it. This in turn implies that the
law endows the State with the power to grant digitization licenses in pre-2001
French-published books whose rightowners do not timely object or, having
objected, do not timely publish. The law thus also steps well beyond "opt
out" in that it not only requires authors and publishers to declare their
ownership and their objections in order to retain their rights, but also, at least
for the publishers, in fact to exercise those rights, lest they be granted to
other publishers, albeit with unspecified remuneration to the original
rightsholders. The remuneration feature makes this an attenuated version of
"use it or lose it." It is, for France, a country long wed to a highly
"propertarian" concept of copyright, 172 a rather radical reworking. It is also
unlikely that the legislature, in its haste to institute a national program of
book scanning, thought through the broader implications of vesting the State
with the authority to direct digital exploitations of out of print books (or
effectively to transfer the author's digital rights to the publishers).173
However conceptually problematic, the French law does offer another
model of permitted-but-paid. One that short circuits the difficulties of
assembling rightsholders into a collecting society, or of extending that
indisponibles-a-la-base-relire-la-bles sure-linsulte-et-la-reaction-en-marche/ ("Loin d'avoir
fait mieux que Google, la France a employe exactement les memes procedes douteux que le
moteur de recherche, avec les memes consequences A la c1." [Far from having done better
than Google, France has employed exactly the same dubious procedures as the search
engine, with the same consequences.]).
171. Florence Marie Piriou, Nouveau regime legal des livres indisponibles du XXe siecle
[New legal regime for 20th-century unavailable books] (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file
with author) ("I ne s'agit ni d'une exception ni d'une cession legale de droits mais plut6t
d'un mandat 16gal." [At issue is neither an exception nor a statutory transfer of rights, but
rather a legal mandate (authorization).]).
172. For example, the first article of the copyright section of the CODE DE LA
PROPRITE INTELLECTUELLE. art. L. 1-111 (Fr.), declares: "L'auteur d'une oeuvre de 1'esprit
jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de sa creation, d'un droit de propri6t6 incorporelle exclusif
et opposable a tous." [The author of a work of authorship enjoys in that work, by the sole
fact of its creation, an incorporeal and exclusive property right which may be asserted against
all.]
173. The French law may also clash with international norms limiting copyright
exceptions and limitations. Because these apply only to foreign works, however, the
legislature has sought to avoid the problem by limiting the law's application to works first
published in France. To the extent that those works may include translations of foreign
authors' works, the legislation may still be vulnerable to challenge for violation of TRIPs art.
13 (should any foreign government seek to bring such a challenge).
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society's authority to represent non-members. And which may produce some
revenue for the authors of books now lying fallow. It is also clear that any
initiative of this scope would require legislative intervention; private ordering
on this scale is not an option.1 4
D. ORPHAN WORKS
In 2012, the European Union issued a Directive regarding orphan works
to permit public libraries and nonprofit national broadcasters to disseminate
works of authors and rightsholders who cannot be located following a
diligent search."' The Directive does not impose an upfront license fee for
use of the work, but requires payment of "fair compensation" to rightowners
who reappear and "put an end" to the work's "orphan" status. 6 Because
member states have until October 29, 2014 to implement the Directive, 7 7
only the United Kingdom and Hungary currently present examples of
compensation schemes. Canada has long established a licensing program for
works whose rightsholders cannot be found."'
1. European Union
The Directive gives member states considerable leeway in addressing the
rights of reappearing rightsholders. Article 6(5) provides that "[m]ember
States shall be free to determine the circumstances under which the payment
of such compensation may be organized.""17
a) United Kingdom
In 2013 the United Kingdom passed the Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24, § 77, "licensing of copyright and performers'
rights," which adds a new orphan-works provision: sections 116A-116D.
The legislation contemplates a licensing regime that may be administered,
174. Cf Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding the scale of proposed settlement inappropriate to private ordering).
175. Council Directive 2012/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
Oct. 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299/5) [hereinafter
Council Directive].
176. Id. art. 6(5) and recital 18.
177. Id. art. 9(1).
178. The Canadian Copyright Board issued its first decision in this regard in 1990.
MacLean Hunter Ltd., Copyright Board Can., File 1990-3 (Aug. 24, 1990), available at
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences/1-b.pdf.
179. The same article states that the level of compensation will be determined by the law
of the member state whose public institution made the use; by contrast, a work's "orphan"
status is determined according to the law of the work's country of origin. See Council
Directive art. 3(3).
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pursuant to regulations, by a state authority and/or through extended
collective licensing. The scheme appears to anticipate that the license fees
will be paid in before any missing rightsholder reappears to claim
compensation, because the law mandates that regulations provide for the
disposition of unclaimed sums paid under the license.so
b) Hungary
Hungary anticipated the Orphan Works Directive by regulations adopted
in 2009.'"' Like the United Kingdom, Hungary has also based its orphan
works regime on upfront licensing, but the sole entity empowered to grant
licenses appears to be the Hungarian Patent Office ("HPO"). The HPO also
rules on the withdrawal of licenses in the event the author becomes known;
the HPO will also determine the extent of the remuneration due to the
author.18 2
2. Canada
Canada's orphan works provisions set out a regime for all potential uses
of orphan works. Section 77 of the Copyright Act permits the Copyright
Board of Canada ("CBC") to issue a non-exclusive license (subject to any
terms the Board establishes) for use in Canada to a user whose reasonable
efforts to locate a copyright owner have been unsuccessful. Section 77
applies to a published work, to a fixation of a performer's performance,
published sound recording, or a fixation of a communication signal in which
copyright subsists. The CBC may grant a non-exclusive license to engage in a
broad range of acts. 83
The CBC will grant a license only if the user can show that he or she
made every reasonable effort to find the copyright owner. There is no
definition of "reasonable effort" in section 77 and no formal standards have
been established by CBC regulation to date (though the legislation permits
the CBC to create the standard). Licensing decisions usually issue within
thirty to forty-five days. In setting the license fee, the CBC generally bases
the rate on what the collecting society that would normally represent the
180. See id. 5 116C(4) ("The regulations must provide for the treatment of any royalties
or other sums paid in respect of a license, including . . . (c) the treatment of sums after that
period (as bona vacantia or otherwise).").
181. 100/2009 (V.8) Korm. rendelet az arva mu egyes felhasznlisainak engede1yezesere
vonatkoz6 r6szletes szabAlyokr6l (Government Decree No. 100/2009 (V.8) on the Detailed
Rules Related to the Licensing of Certain Use of Orphan Works), arts. 2(1), 2(2), 3 (Hung.),
available athttp://www.hipo.gov.hu/English/jogforras/100_2009.pdf.
182. Id. arts. 7, 8.
183. See Copyright Act R.S.C. 2012, c.C-42, art. 31 (Can.).
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rightsholder charges for the type of use in question and then orders that
royalties be paid directly to that collecting society (the system assumes that
every class of rightsholder will have a corresponding collecting society)."'
Under section 77, the subsequently appearing copyright owner may collect
the royalties fixed in the license no later than five years after its expiration.
The CBC allows collecting societies to dispose of the royalties as it sees fit
for the general benefit of its members, but the society undertakes to
reimburse any person who establishes, within five years after the expiry of
the license, ownership of the work covered by the license.'
IV. PROPOSAL FOR U.S. COPYRIGHT REFORM:
LEGISLATION IN AID OF PRIVATE ORDERING
A. To WHAT EXTENT Do WE ALREADY HAVE PERMITTED-BUT-PAID?
If, rather than excusing altogether some socially beneficial or market-
failure non-authorship uses of copyrighted works, requiring payment for
them would be desirable, how might we achieve that end? In the first place,
we should inquire to what extent we already have permitted-but-paid
regimes. Some of these exist in the form of statutory compulsory licenses.
Others may be emerging as a result of judicial reluctance in the wake of eBay
v. MercExchange to grant injunctive relief. Fuller examination suggests,
however, that the Supreme Court's decision has not lead to a generalized
substitution of damage awards (judge-made compulsory licenses) in lieu of
injunctions.
1. Extant Compulsory-License Regimes
The 1976 U.S. Copyright Act institutes compulsory licenses such as:
mechanical licenses for creation of sound recordings of non-dramatic musical
compositions for distribution of phonorecords to the public (5 115); cable
and satellite retransmissions (55 111, 119, 122); non-interactive digital
performances of sound recordings (5114); public broadcasting (5 118); and
184. Telephone Interview with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis,
Copyright Board Canada (Mar. 3, 2014). A list of CBC licenses can be found at Decisions-
Unlocatable Copyrght Owners, COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, http://www.cb-cda.gc.
ca/unlocatable-introuvables/icences-e.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). CBC refusals to grant
an unlocatable right owner can be found at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-
introuvables/denied-refusees-e.html
185. See Unlocatable Copyrght Owners, COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA (July 7, 2001),
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/brochure2-e.html.
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jukeboxes (§ 116)."' The statute also favors negotiated solutions in lieu of
administrative rate-setting,187 and accordingly provides in several instances
for antitrust exemptions to enable industry-wide licensing negotiations; the
compulsory licenses, in turn, serve as backstops should private ordering
fail."' Furthermore, the statute creates a Copyright Royalty Board ("CRB")
to set the rates, but a CRB proceeding can be both lengthy and expensive.1 89
A recent Copyright Office study acknowledges that
[p]roceedings may involve numerous interested parties and often
take two years or longer to complete. The CRB process allows for
significant discovery, including document production and
depositions, though it is not as broad as discovery permitted under
the Federal Rules. Trials before the CRB, relatively formal in
nature, typically involve multiple expert and non-expert witnesses
and voluminous economic evidence, and can last several weeks.190
186. 17 U.S.C. §5 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122 (2012).
187. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 803(b)(3) (2012) (three-month voluntary negotiation period
following initiation of CRB rate-making proceeding), 5 805 ("General rule for voluntarily
negotiated agreements"). Of the ratemakings published in the Federal Register (which
include those that settle and those that do not), nine have settled prior to the CRB's final
independent determination, while seven have not. (The CRB was created in 2004, and the
first final rule promulgated by the CRB was in 2007.)
188. See id. 55 114, 115(c)(3)(B), 116, 118; see also § 115 (describing inter-industry
agreement and settlement rates).
189. See id. §§ 803, 804 (setting out CRB proceedings in extensive detail). Regarding the
cost and duration of CRB proceedings, Music Choice's written statement alone in one case
constituted 1671 pages. See Determination of Rates and TermsforPreexisting Subscyrttion Services and
Satellite DigitalAudio Radio Services, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (Spring 2013), available
at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2011-1/. Sirius XM's statement in the same
proceeding was 1689 pages. Copyright royalty hearings can involve extensive expert
testimony as well. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord's 2009 Delivery Rate Determination
Proceeding involved dozens of witnesses' testimony from three interested parties at initial
hearings and as part of rebuttal testimony; see 74 C.F.R. 6832, Mechanical and Digital
Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding; Review of Copyright Royalty Judges
Determination; Final Rule and Notice (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.loc.gov
/crb/fedreg/2009/74fr4510.pdf#page=2. With respect to duration of a ratemaking
proceeding, a contested ratemaking takes roughly two years; ratemakings with early
settlements usually take less time, often around one year or even less. For the 2011
Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Services (section 114 ratesetting for 2013-17), the ratemaking commenced on
January 5, 2011 with notice in the Federal Register, and was concluded February 14, 2013.
190. Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copyrnghts, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
at *63 (September 2013), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/.
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Moreover, since rates may require revision over time, the statute also
provides a schedule for revisiting prior rate settings."' Compulsory licenses
have been criticized as excessively cumbersome and insufficiently responsive
to technological and market evolutions.' 9 2
2. The Effect of eBay: Will Failed Fair Use Defenses Yield Only Monetay
Remedies (De Facto Permitted-But-Paid)?
While statutory compulsory licenses govern only those situations
expressly designated by Congress, judge-made compulsory licenses (some
even authorized in the Copyright Act'") could introduce desirable flexibility
more broadly. The Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of
America, having found the use of the videotape recorder to record off-air
television programming to infringe, posited a "continuing royalty" in lieu of
an injunction.194 (How judges would set the rate, and whether undertaking
such a task would be desirable, is another matter.9 )
Arguably, the Supreme Court's ruling in eBay v. MercExchange, that
irreparable harm should not be presumed upon proof of patent infringement,
will chasten judges in all intellectual property infringement cases, and will
lead to fewer grants of injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases as
well.'96 Withholding injunctive relief would set the stage for inter-party
191. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (adjustment of rates for cable retransmissions),
§ 804(b)(4) ("A petition described in subsection (a) to initiate proceedings under
section 801(b)(1) concerning the adjustment or determination of royalty rates as provided in
section 115 may be filed in the year 2006 and in each subsequent fifth calendar year, or at
such other times as the parties have agreed under section 115(c)(3)(B) and (C)") (2012).
192. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992);
Robert P. Merges, Of Propery Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Propery, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655,
2669 (1994) (speculating that compulsory license regimes "may prevent the creation of
technologies and organizational innovations that would efficiently administer the rights-
clearance process").
193. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(3)(B) (2011)
194. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, at 976 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev.'d. 646 U.S. 417 (1984) ("[W]hen great public injury would result from an injunction, a
court could award damages or a continuing royalty. This may very well be an acceptable
resolution in this context.")
195. Cf Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 193 (2008) (surveying patent cases and contending that judicial rate setting is
undesirable).
196. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (reading eBay to apply to
copyright infringement cases; the case involved an unsuccessful fair use defense of the
publication of an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye). For a critical view of eBay and
its likely impact in copyright cases, see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith,
The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
203 (2012).
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negotiations, though it could also considerably reduce the bargaining power
of the copyright owner who can no longer wield a credible threat to compel
the defendant to cease its activities.
A review of post-eBay copyright cases, however, indicates that denial of
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases falls far short of
general or systematic.' With respect to permanent injunctions, only five of
twenty-three cases studied through 2013 withheld injunctive relief despite the
plaintiff's success on the merits, and, with one exception, none involved a
finding of likely future infringement."' Regarding preliminary injunctions, in
ten cases the court found likely success on the merits and in seven of them it
also found irreparable injury and issued the preliminary injunction.' Thus,
looking to the courts to implement permitted-but-paid by withholding
injunctive relief to copyright owners whose substantive claims have
succeeded does not seem a likely course.
197. See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 215 (2012) (analyzing cases up to 2010). For a review of post-eBa awards (or
withholding) of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases generally, through 2013, I
thank Trey Brewer, Columbia Law School class of 2014.
198. See Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir.
2007) (showing irreparable harm, as well as inadequacy of monetary damages, but balance of
hardship and public interest not proven); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Pedre Watch Co., No.
1 1cv00637 AJB (WVG), 2013 WL 5719071 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (showing no irreparable
harm because there was no proof of likely future infringement and inadequate proof of
reputational harm); Bean v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. CV 11-08028-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL
1078662 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012) (showing no irreparable harm in this case because plaintiff
(a photographer) could not prove the likelihood of future infringement, because the books
that unlawfully contained his photographs were out of print); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Ltd. P'ship, No, CIV.A. MJG-08-397, 2011 WL 5445947 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011) (showing no
irreparable harm because the logo which the Ravens unlawfully used had no commercial
value other than its use by the Ravens; the judge ordered the two parties to negotiate a
licensing agreement in the only post-eBay copyright decision so far to have ordered
negotiation); Magna-RX, Inc. v. Holley, No. CVO5-3545-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 5068977 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 25, 2008) (plaintiff failed to give any evidence regarding irreparable harm,
possibly in mistaken belief that irreparable harm was presumed after a finding of
infringement).
199. See Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App'x 351 (4th
Cir. 2011) (district court was unconvinced by plaintiffs showing of irreparable harm); Frerck
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (photographer gave a
limited license to a textbook publisher to publish his photos, but the textbook publisher
exceeded the terms of the license; the Court found damages constituted sufficient relief in
light of industry practice of retroactive licenses covering uses not originally bargained or
paid-for); Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 316
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (very similar to Frerck).
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B. How MUCH CAN ONE ACHIEVE BY PRIVATE ORDERING WITHOUT
LEGISLATION? IS COURT-ORDERED "LICENSE IT OR LOSE IT" AN
ANSWER?
On the other hand, the prospects may look different if the court makes
success on the merits turn on the offer of a license, as did the district court in
Cambridge University Press P. Becker.200 The impact on the copyright owner's
bargaining position may be less substantial than first appears, at least where
the plaintiff was seeking to be paid for the use rather than to prevent it
altogether, because a defendant who declines a reasonable license may be
subject to an award of substantial statutory damages, as well as injunctive
relief.20' But the problem of assessing whether the license the plaintiff offered
was reasonable may thrust courts back into the rate-making business, to
which generalist federal judges may be less well-suited than the specialized
Copyright Royalty Board. Alternatively, following the example of the "rate
court" jurisdiction vested in the Southern District of New York under the
antitrust degree with the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP"),202 Congress might designate one particular federal
district court (which in turn would name one particular judge) to assess the
reasonableness of the proffered license.
C. LEGISLATION To ENABLE PRIVATE ORDERING?
If full-blown administrative ratemaking is too expensive and takes too
long, but license-it-or-lose-it presents the problem of excessive judicial
intervention (or, conversely, for those judges disinclined to second-guess
proposed licensing fees, excessive deference to copyright owners), perhaps a
simplified ratemaking procedure could provide a happy medium. In addition,
the procedure should be designed to ensure that authors share equally in the
remuneration. I envision a combination of two models, one based on
voluntary negotiation of licenses, inspired by a proposed amendment to
200. Supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (analyzing the "license it or lose it"
approach of the Georgia State court).
201. Statutory damages are available if the work was registered with the Copyright
Office prior to its infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2011). As such, professional publishers
tend to systematically register. Of course, no damages, statutory or actual, may be awarded
against a state entity, such as Georgia State University; see Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (addressing the Lanham Trademark
Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(addressing the Patent Act).
202. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, No. 41-1395
(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (second amended final judgment
revising original consent decree of 1941). Denise Cote currently is the SDNY judge who
hears challenges to rates proposed by ASCAP.
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section 114 of the Copyright Act's provision on compulsory licenses for non-
interactive digital transmission of sound recordings,2 03 but backed up by
Copyright Royalty Board-administered last-best-offer, or "baseball,"
arbitration. With respect to the latter solution, it is necessary also to consider
the institutional setting for the rate determinations as well as the application
of baseball arbitration to the copyright context. Finally, any provision for a
"backstop" of administrative ratemaking should also contain a "sunset"
clause requiring legislative renewal every five years (otherwise the ratemaking
authorization expires), in order to promote a transition to market licensing in
the event that changing conditions make such licensing feasible.
At the threshold, however, we need to identify the uses to which the
proposed regime would apply. Recalling our two categories of fair uses which
I have contended should not remain uncompensated-nonprofit public
library uses and educational uses-these uses have in effect benefitted from
fair use as social subsidy. And there are uses, generally massive in scope, for
which market licensing solutions have not yet been devised. Our review of
comparative law reveals that remuneration schemes involving voluntary or
state-supported licensing mechanisms generally correspond to these broad
categories. But a principal difference between the United States and most
other countries studied is the prevalence of collective licensing societies
outside the United States. Indeed, as the French legislation on mass
digitization of books illustrates, implementation of the scheme required the
creation of a collecting society dedicated to administering the licenses.204
Apart from the fields of public performance rights in non-dramatic musical
compositions, where ASCAP and BMI collectively license users large and
small (and operate under antitrust consent decrees 20 ), and, to a lesser extent,
reprographic and digital reproduction rights in books licensed by the
Copyright Clearance Center, collective management of authors' rights is far
less pervasive here in the United States than in most other copyright-
producing countries. As a result, unless new collective management societies
emerge, or unless the major rightsholders of particular kinds of repertory
may combine without antitrust constraints to offer licenses across the
203. Free Market Royalty Act, H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
204. Supra Subsection III.C. Similarly, the rejected Google Books settlement would have
created a "Book Rights Registry" collecting society to grant licenses to digitize out-of-
commerce books and to distribute the collected monies to authors and publishers. Authors
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
205. 17 U.S.C. 5 115(c)(3)(B) (2012).
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repertory, implementation of voluntary licensing mechanisms is likely to
encounter daunting transaction costs. Moreover, where multiple users
comprise the class of potential licensees it may also be necessary to consider
how the class may be represented in the negotiations .20  State-supported
backstops to voluntary licensing can of course relieve the antitrust
constraints on rate-setting (as is already the case for certain compulsory
licenses208), but those solutions take us out of the realm of private ordering,
and into legislation to establish an administrative framework to offer a rate-
setting mechanism that is faster, cheaper, and, to the extent possible, closer
to market solutions than the current panoply of compulsory licenses affords.
1. H.R 3219: 'Free Market Royaly Act"
In 1995 and again in 1998, Congress amended the copyright act to
implement a digital public-performance right in sound recordings. The
legislation distinguished interactive from non-interactive digital
transmissions, subjecting the latter to compulsory licensing. The regime
directed the equal division of the proceeds of the compulsory license among
record producers and performers.209 The statutory provisions also permitted
copyright owners and webcasters to reach private agreements on license
rates;210 as a result, many performers may not in fact receive an equal share of
the licensing revenues. 211 An amendment proposed in December 2013, the
206. See, e.g., Sound Exchange, a society representing sound recording producers and
performers, that collects and distributes the compulsory license royalty for non-interactive
webcasting under § 114. SOUND EXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/
about/(last visited June 1, 2014).
207. For example, in setting the license fees for public performances of non-dramatic
musical compositions by bars and restaurants, ASCAP and BMI negotiate with the
restaurateurs' trade association; see, e.g., Legislative Information & Representation, MINN.
RESTAURANT Ass'N, http://www.hospitalitymn.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=l&
subarticlenbr=85 (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (noting that members of Minnesota Restaurant
Association receive BMI music license with discounted rates, though each member must still
obtain individual license). In the royalty negotiations for video-programing licenses, small
cable operators may designate a Bargaining Agent; see DIRECTV Sports Net Pittsburgh,
LLC, 11 F.C.C 1483 (2011).
208. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (describing antitrust exemptions in extant
compulsory licensing regimes).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f, (g)(2 ) (2012); see generall Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyightlegislationfor
the 'Digital Millennium", 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 169-70 (1999) (describing and
analyzing 1995 and 1998 amendments).
210. 17 U.S.C. 5 114(0(3) (2012).
211. See Kristelia A. Garcia, Private Copyright Reform, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 1, 4 (2013) ("These private content licensing agreements circumvent both the statutory
license and relevant collective rights organization . . . and in so doing ... potentially alter the
rights and entitlements of non-parties in several significant ways[,]" including "deny[ing]
artist royalty payments to which they are legally entitled."); see also Ben Sisario, Sirius's Move to
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"free market royalty act,"2 12 would, among other things, replace the current
compulsory license regime for non-interactive digital transmissions with
Bypass a Royaly Payment Clearinghouse Causes an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/business/media/siriuss-move-to-bypass-royalty-
agency-causes-uproar.html (noting that private agreements "could result in less money and
more complications for artists," largely due to a lack of clarity as to how the author receives
payment); Kristin Thomson, Musicians' Digital Performance Royalties at Risk, FUTURE OF MUSIC
COALITION (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:32 PM), http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2011/10/28/
musicians-digital-performance-royalties-risk/ (arguing that direct licenses can burt
performers because they may not receive direct payments, could be paid less, will not be part
of negotiations, and could be forced to accept licenses allowing for more expansive use of
their music).
212. H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) provides in relevant part:
(e) EFFICIENCY OF LICENSING.-
(1) COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR NON- INTERACTIVE
SERVICES.-Pursuant to section 106(6), and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any noninteractive services performing sound recordings
publicly by means of an audio transmission may collectively negotiate and
agree to royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the
performance of such sound recordings.
(2) ONE-STOP LICENSING FOR NONINTERACTIVE
SERVICES.-
(A) NEGOTIATION OF LICENSES BY COMMON AGENT.-
Pursuant to section 106(6), and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, for licenses for noninteractive audio transmissions, SoundExchange,
Inc., or any successor entity is designated as the sole common agent to
negotiate, agree to, pay, and receive payments under this section. If a
license for noninteractive audio transmissions is agreed to by such
common agent, copyright owners of sound recordings may subsequently
negotiate and agree to royalty rates and license terms and conditions with
any noninteractive services performing sound recordings publicly by
means of an audio transmission for the performance of such sound
recordings.
(B) DIRECT PAYMENT AND EQUAL COMPENSATION.-The
common agent under sub-paragraph (A) shall make distributions directly
to the following recipients from payments collected under this section as
follows:
(i) 50 percent shall be paid to the copyright owner.
(ii) 45 percent shall be paid to featured recording artists.
(iii) 5 percent shall be paid to nonfeatured musicians and vocalists
(through the American Federation of Musicians and Screen Actors Guild-
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Intellectual Property
Rights Distribution Fund, or their successors).
(f) PAYMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL LICENSES FOR
NONINTERACTIVE AUDIO TRANSMISSIONS.-In the case of a
license granted by the copyright owner of a sound recording to a
noninteractive service performing sound recordings publicly by means of
an audio transmission, such service shall pay to the common agent
described in subsection (e) receipts from the licensing of such
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licenses covering digital transmissions negotiated between a "common agent"
representing the copyright owners (currently Sound Exchange) and a
collective representative of the webcasters. The negotiations would proceed
"notwithstanding any other provision of law," and therefore would be
exempt from antitrust constraints. The amendment preserves section 114's
even division of the proceeds of the license between producers and
performers. But, importantly, the amendment makes the performers' share
mandatory by requiring that the webcaster pay the common agent fifty
percent of the royalties the webcaster owes under the license, and further
instructing that the common agent "shall distribute" those payments to the
performers.
The proposed amendment also establishes a compulsory license
"backstop for public and non-commercial stations" in the event that royalty
rates and license terms "are not negotiated and agreed upon collectively
under subsection (e) between the common agent and a non-commercial
educational broadcast station . . . " In that case, the Copyright Royalty Board
will set rates that are supposed to emulate willing buyer-seller marketplace
rates, but one may suppose that the failure of the parties to agree on a license
means that the rates are likely to fall short of true market rates. The proposed
transmissions in an amount equal to 50 percent of the total royalties and
other compensation that the service is required to pay for such
transmissions under the applicable license agreement. Such common
agent shall distribute such payments in proportion to the distributions
provided in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subsection (e)(2)(B), and such payments
shall be the sole payments to which featured and nonfeatured artists are
entitled by reason of such transmissions under the license with that
service.
(g) BACKSTOP FOR PUBLIC AND NONCOMMERCIAL
STATIONS.-
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF RATES AND TERMS.- If royalty rates
and license terms and conditions for the audio transmission or
retransmission of a non-subscription broadcast consisting solely of non-
commercial educational and cultural radio programs are not negotiated
and agreed upon collectively under subsection (e) between the common
agent and a noncommercial educational broadcast station funded on or
after January 1, 1995, under section 396(k) of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 396(k)), a proceeding under chapter 8 of this title shall
determine the rates and terms for such transmissions and retransmissions.
The Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish such rates and terms that
most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall
base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming
information presented by the parties.
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amendment does not specify whether the CRB-designated royalty will be
shared equally among producers and performers, but that may be implicit.
The Free Market Royalty Act offers an attractive template for permitted-
but-paid licenses. By suspending antitrust constraints, and by encouraging the
development of a user-side collective complement to the copyright interests'
"common agent," the bill would stimulate bilateral industry-wide agreements,
thus reducing transaction costs. Were this approach to be generalized to
sectors in which copyright owner-author common agents are less prevalent
(or non-existent) it would be necessary to foster the creation of such
bargaining entities. The mandatory set-aside for creators is another very
appealing feature.
But what if the collective representatives fail to agree? Should the
"backstop" measures of the Free Market Royalty Act also be generalized, not
only to non-commercial users (i.e., subsidy uses), such as nonprofit libraries
and educational institutions, but to all? Is it justified to extend the backstop
to commercial users if the basis of their permitted-but-paid license is market
failure, given that an amendment inspired by the Free Market Royalty Act
would make bargaining easier by allowing the aggregation of owners and
users and negotiation through respective representatives? If these devices
effectively cure market failures, then a compulsory license backstop would
not be warranted. Moreover, were compulsory licensing an option should
negotiations fail, actors who believe they have more to gain from a
compulsory license regime than from a negotiated license might not bargain
in good faith. Finally, a CRB proceeding is currently both expensive and time
consuming.213 Accordingly, the current regime might warrant some
modifications. The technique of last best-offer arbitration might prove
adaptable to the task.
2. BaseballArbitration: Institutional Constraints
Before addressing how a last-best-offer "backstop" would apply to
copyright licenses, it is necessary to confront possible constraints on
Congress's power to amend the Copyright Act to compel the parties to
submit to binding arbitration.
The Copyright Royalty Board is an arm of the Copyright Office, which is
a branch of the Library of Congress. The CRB already is empowered to set
rates for the various compulsory licenses set out in the Copyright act; the
proposed scheme, albeit what one might call "ratemaking light," seems well
within the Board's attributions. Because copyright is federal statutory subject
213. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
1441
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1383
matter, and "the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme," 2 14
copyright claims can reasonably be described as claims involving "public
rights" suitable for adjudication by non-Article III tribunals.2 15 With respect
to the appointments clause, CRB judges have already been held "inferior
officers" terminable at will by their "head of department" (in this case, the
Librarian of Congress), and therefore their appointments do not violate
separation of powers.216
Because the proposed regime relies on binding and compulsory
arbitration, the scheme exceeds the bounds imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act. Without an amendment to the Copyright Act to mandate
arbitration in relevant cases, the Library of Congress's power to administer
arbitrations would be limited to what the APA allows: all arbitrations would
require the consent of both parties, the arbitrators would be agreed upon by
both parties, and the parties would have to agree on all issues submitted to
the arbitrator.217
By contrast, specific statutory provisions can confer the requisite
authority. For example the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act allow for the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and Department of the Interior, respectively, to authorize
arbitration upon the request of only one party during negotiations.218 The
statute does not need to specify the type of arbitration used by the agency;
214. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (characterizing public rights cases as
"cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited
regulatory objective within the agency's authority.').
215. Cf Report of the Register of Copyright, Copyright Small Claims, supra note 190
("Because the rights and remedies for copyright are fixed by Congress pursuant to an
overarching statutory scheme ... at least some types of small copyright claims should be
amenable to non-Article III resolution."). The Supreme Court's decisions in Thomas v. Union
Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2594 suggest that a copyright-licensing
dispute would be properly cast as a public-rights case, and that agency-administered
arbitration would be appropriate. Indeed, the particular statute in question in Thomas v. Union
Carbide involved the constitutionality of a Congressional statute that selected binding
arbitration (with limited judicial review) as the means for dispute resolution for participants
in a federal pesticide registration scheme. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-75.
216. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cit. 2012)
(following Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)) (barring "double for-
cause removal").
217. See 5 U.S.C. 5 575(a)(1) (2012) (a decision to arbitrate must be voluntary on the part
of all parties to the arbitration); § 575(a)(1)(A), (lB) (any party can limit the issues it agrees to
submit to arbitration; this could mean that a party may refuse to arbitrate unless the decision
is limited to a range of outcomes); 5 577(a) (the parties to an arbitration are entitled to
participate in selecting an arbitrator; this could result in naming arbitrators who are not CRB
judges).
218. See 47 U.S.C. 5 252(b) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).
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the agency is at liberty to promulgate rules developing its own procedures for
arbitration. For example, FCC rules promulgated pursuant to the
Telecommunications Act instruct that "[a]n arbitrator, acting pursuant to the
Commission's authority under section 252(e)(5) of the Act, shall use final
offer arbitration," subject to carefully delineated exceptions.21 9
3. How BaseballArbitration CouldAppy to Permitted-But-Paid
To assess how a baseball-arbitration fallback could apply to a permitted-but-
paid regime in copyright law, it may help to look to experience in the Federal
Communications Commission. The FCC context admittedly differs from the
licenses posited here, because the FCC has employed baseball arbitration as a
condition on authorizing the merger of cable operators: when the merger
would otherwise result in conferring too much power over video
programming, the operator must license the programming to local carriers at
a reasonable rate.220 Baseball arbitration provides the means by which the
FCC sets that rate.
If the contexts are by no means identical, they are arguably analogous:
the impetus for U.S. courts to find fair use in many of the social-subsidy or
market-failure contexts for which licensing mechanisms exist in other
countries is to prevent the copyright law from conferring power over content
to the unreasonable prejudice of certain public services or technological
advances. (Because the essence of copyright-as a property right-is control
over the exploitations comprised within the statutory exclusive rights, the
author's or rightsholder's control over content remains in most cases the
219. 47 C.F.R. 5 51.807 (2011). In 2001, the Senate proposed amending tide 49 of the
United States Code to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to mandate baseball-style
arbitration in the case of labor disputes between an air carrier and its employees-the
Secretary could forestall a strike by compelling the parties to submit to binding baseball-style
arbitration. See Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 1327, 107th Cong. (as
reported by S. Comm., 2001). This bill ultimately died in committee.
Finally, the timing of the arbitration may carry Seventh Amendment implications. If
a copyright holder and would-be licensee fail to agree voluntarily upon a price for a license,
but seek administrative dispute resolution in lieu of initiating an infringement action, there
would appear to be no constitutional impediment to pursuing an administrative remedy. If,
however, arbitration were sought after the filing of an infringement action, the Supreme
Court's decision in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1997)-holding
that litigants in a copyright dispute are entitled to a trial by jury, even when statutory
damages (a seemingly "public" right conferred by Congress) are the only damages sought-
might entitle either party to resist the administrative procedure on the ground that the court
action triggers that party's right not only to a judicial rather than administrative remedy, but
to a jury trial as well.
220. See Liberty Media Order, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. at 3346, Appendix B, Condition IV, 1
(submission to commercial arbitration); § A "Commercial Arbitration Remedy," 6, 8, 10
(final offer arbitration).
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appropriate objective of the copyright system; the prejudice that a mandatory
arbitration system offsets must therefore be unreasonable.)
A fundamental principle behind baseball arbitration is to encourage
private ordering and incentivize settlement. By requiring the arbitrator to
select one of two proposed offers, baseball arbitration urges the parties to
avoid extremes by confronting them with the risk that the arbitrator will
accept the other party's offer. The academic literature differs on whether
baseball-style arbitration does successfully push parties toward more
"reasonable" offers, though what empirical data there is seems to suggest
that offers do converge.22
In addition, this arbitration mechanism could at least in part avoid the
extensive economic and market analysis required in "willing buyer/willing
seller" ratemaking in order to determine the proper market rate. "Willing
buyer/willing seller" ratemaking, as currently administered by the Copyright
Royalty Judges, involves presentation of written and testimonial direct
evidence and rebuttal testimony, legal briefing, arguments of counsel, and
judicial review.222 As a result, the most recent ratemaking took over five years
from the initial notice-and-comment period until the Judges' final
determination.223
Admittedly, some final-offer arbitration mechanisms are similarly
expensive and time consuming. For example, the FCC proceedings described
above often produce large expenses for both parties arbitrating, and though
it is supposed to take place over a short period of time (thirty days from
notice to arbitration decision, and then thirty days for a decision from the
FCC, if a party appeals), parties are allowed to alter the time limits as they see
221. Academic studies of final-offer arbitration in the context of public-sector union
negotiations indicate that the procedure does indeed encourage settlement. See Elissa A.
Meth, Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Modelfor Dispute Resolution In Domestic and International
Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383 (1998). For the original baseball context, see Jonathan
M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 232-34
(1998) (suggesting that MLB's arbitration procedure has "achieved its goal" of "getting the
parties to either settle their cases prior to arbitration, or at least to submit figures that are
within the same ballpark."). Josh Chetwynd notes that while labor relations theorists endorse
the view that final-offer arbitration encourages convergence in the parties' proposals,
decision scientists often disagree. Josh Cherwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer
Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage
and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 116 (2009). Chetwynd acknowledges,
however, that "empirical data had indicated that convergence was often occurring." Id.
222. See Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,102-03 (Apr. 25, 2014) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. 380).
223. Id. at 23,102.
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fit.2 24 Others, such as the procedure in Major League Baseball, are relatively
speedy and efficient.225
Another issue concerns disparities in bargaining power. Final-offer
arbitration appears to diminish parties' inherent bargaining disparity in the
baseball context, as well as in the case of public-sector employee unions. In
Major League Baseball, one recent study indicated that the players (the labor
side) were successful in forty-two percent of arbitration proceedings that
went to a final hearing.226 For public-sector unions, one study examined New
Jersey cases and found the party with weaker bargaining power-the
unions-won roughly two-thirds of the time.227 This evidence suggests that
parties in a relatively weak bargaining position can nevertheless succeed in
baseball-style arbitration simply by avoiding risk and submitting reasonable
bids. Moreover, designation of a "common agent" to represent a group of
weaker parties may further reduce the bargaining disparities.
V. CONCLUSION
Fair use has gone off the rails with the transformation of "transformative
use" from a factor fostering new creativity to one favoring new copyright-
dependent business models and socially beneficent reiterative uses. We
should cease muddling authorship-grounded fair uses with judge-made
exceptions whose impetus derives from distinct considerations. I have,
moreover, suggested that those exceptions should not always produce free
224. Comcast Co., 11 F.C.C. 4, 129, App. A (2011) ("The parties may agree to modify
any of the time limits set forth [in the arbitration rules] . . . .").
225. See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5
SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 228-29 (1998) (describing the annual two-month window for
arbitration proceedings in Major League Baseball).
226. Amy Farmer et. al., The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball,
47 J.L. & ECON. 543, 562 (2004). However, that author attributes these outcomes to the
players being less risk averse than owners in such negotiations, and consequently more often
on the losing side; see id. at 562-63 ("We find that players tend to exhibit greater aggression
than clubs and that ultimately players fare worse when their aggression leads them to
arbitration. Our evidence also suggests that players learn, because previously eligible players
fare slightly better than do those in first-time negotiations.").
227. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and
Evidence 16 (1983), (unpublished working paper) (on file with National Bureau of
Economic Research). Ashenfelter and Bloom credited this victory rate to more reasonable,
risk-averse offers submitted by the New Jersey unions. For a more recent study, see Orley
Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of
Expert Agents: An Empiical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration 2 (Princeton L. & Pub. Aff. J.,
Working Paper No. 04-009, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=559188 (finding
that the "spread" between the two offers decreased from over 2 % to less than 1% over a
period of roughly twenty years, suggesting that parties do indeed converge on offers over
time.)
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passes. Instead, I have proposed a middle ground: many of the current social-
subsidy fair uses and market-failure fair uses should be permitted-but-paid.
This article has recommended implementing that proposal through
statutorily facilitated bargaining between agents representing copyright
owners and users, backed up by last best-offer arbitration before the
Copyright Royalty Board. Whichever method employed to set the rates for
permitted-but-paid uses, the copyright law should ensure that authors share
in any statutory or privately ordered remuneration scheme. For many authors
and other members of the creative communities, while their works stoke the
engines of others' enterprises, the Internet age has proffered more rags than
riches. Were permitted-but-paid an option, creators might fare better from
new distribution uses. Moreover, we would not be lured by a dichotomy
falsely pitting authors against a perceived social good: the licensing
mechanism would allow both broader dissemination and provide payment to
authors. For many distribution uses, permitted-but-paid should replace fair
use for free.
1446
